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THE PARADOX OF HOPE: THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CHERYL HANNA
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, a Chicago district court judge allowed Samuel
Gutierrez to enroll in a batterer treatment program in exchange
for pleading guilty to choking his girlfriend Kelly Gonzalez. This
was one of nine incidents of abuse documented by Chicago police
reports.
Then, in August 1996, after failing to appear for a status hear-
ing, the police again arrested Gutierrez for beating Gonzalez.
Five days later, the judge imposed, then stayed, a 120-day sen-
tence, again ordering Gutierrez to enroll in treatment. One month
later, in September 1996, the same judge continued the case. For
the third time, Gutierrez was told to get counseling or face jail.
In February 1997, Kelly Gonzalez's body was found; Gutierrez
admitted to killing and hiding her body back in September 1996.
If Gutierrez is telling the truth, then he killed Gonzalez when he
should have been in treatment.'
* Assistant Professor, Vermont Law School. B.A. 1988, Kalamazoo College; J.D.
1992, Harvard Law School. The author formerly served as an Assistant State's At-
torney in the Baltimore City Domestic Violence Unit, with support from an Irving R.
Kaufinan Fellowship. I am grateful to Lydia Bottome for her research assistance and
fiendship throughout this project. Thanks also to my colleagues at Vermont Law
School for their continued support. In particular, I am grateful to Susan Apel, Laura
Gillen, Oliver Goodenough, Ken Kreiling, Cam Macrae, and Peter Teachout for com-
ments and suggestions on earlier drafts. I'd also like to thank Lynn Mather and
Roger Masters from the Dartmouth College Law Society for the opportunity to pres-
ent this paper and for their helpful comments and insights. My heartfelt thanks also
to Debby Denno, David Faigman, Owen Jones, and Russell Korobkin for taking the
time to review this piece and provide invaluable feedback. Finally, I am indebted to
Elizabeth Schneider for her inspiration, guidance, and support.
1. See T. Shawn Taylor, Domestic Violence Has Fatal End: Crack in Will Sys-
tem Could Take Some Blame, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL
3536053.
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The criminal justice system arguably "did the right thing" in
this case. The defendant was arrested, prosecuted, and sen-
tenced to a batterer treatment program intended to aid him in
unlearning his violent behavior. A probation officer even fol-
lowed up to ensure that Gutierrez met his conditions of release.
An aggressive state response from arrest to post-disposition was
expected to keep Kelly Gonzalez alive. Why did the promise of
punishment go unfulfilled in this and other instances?
This case illustrates a challenge to those of us who have ar-
gued for aggressive criminal intervention in domestic violence
cases.2 The criminal justice system has made enormous strides
in treating domestic violence as a serious crime.3 We have devel-
2. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Do-
mestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996). In this piece, I argue
that ultimately the decision to proceed with a criminal domestic violence case should
rest with the prosecutor, not the victim. See id. Prosecutors should base their deci-
sion to pursue a case on the sufficiency of the evidence and the seriousness of the
offense. See id. at 1908. Mandated participation policies might mean that in some
cases a victim would be compelled to testify against her wishes. See id. at 1907. In
the long term, however, policies that mandate victim participation keep women safer
by removing the abuser's incentive to intimidate and harass the victim as well as by
reinforcing the idea that domestic violence is a public crime, not a private affair. See
id.
Some argue that my position suggests that all domestic violence cases ought to
be prosecuted. See Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight: A New Job Description for
the Battered Woman's Prosecutor and Other More Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 183, 183 (1997); Joan L. Neisser, Lessons for the United States: A
Greek Cypriot Model for Domestic Violence Law, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 171, 183-
84 (1996). It does not. Rather, I argue that in those cases where the prosecution has
enough evidence to go forward, the better, albeit imperfect, solution many times is
to proceed with the case rather than dismiss the charges at the victim's request. I
do not advocate going forward in cases where the evidence is insufficient to over-
come the presumption of innocence. I further acknowledge that aggressive
criminalization will have costs, particularly to women's autonomy and decision mak-
ing. See Hanna, supra, at 1871-73. Nevertheless, early evaluation of aggressive pros-
ecution programs show a reduction in recidivism and domestic homicides. See id. at
1864-65.
This Article continues to explore how the criminal justice system can better re-
spond to domestic violence via more refined punishment alternatives.
3. See JEFFREY FAGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMES-
TIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMrTS 6-10 (1996); Hanna, supra note 2, at 1852; Don-
ald J. Rebovich, Prosecution Response to Domestic Violence: Results of a Survey of
Large Jurisdictions, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 176, 189 (Eve
S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996); Casey G. Gwinn, The Path to Effective In-
tervention: Trends in the Criminal Prosecution of Domestic Violence, THE PROSECU-
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veloped a better understanding of the relative costs and benefits
of arrest4 and prosecution policies in these cases,5 but there has
been little discussion on sentencing theory and practice.6 A criti-
cal look at sentencing suggests that many in the criminal justice
system operate under faulty assumptions about the effectiveness
of treatment and the futility of incarceration. Unless we take a
harder look at punishment in domestic violence cases, we fool
ourselves into thinking that well-intentioned arrest and prosecu-
tion policies alone will sufficiently curb domestic violence.
This Article argues that the preference for treatment as
TOR, NovjDec. 1993, at 17; Kerry G. Wangberg, Reducing Case Attrition in Domestic
Violence Cases: A Prosecutor's Perspective, THE PROSECUTOR, Winter 1991, at 9, 9.
For an overview of domestic violence legal reforms, see Catherine F. Klein &
Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State
Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801 (1993); Developments in the
Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Developments]; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Legal Reform Efforts to Assist Battered
Women: Past Present and Future (1990) (unpublished report, on file at the Vermont
Law School Library).
4. See, e.g., Sarah Mansolff Buel, Recent Development, Mandatory Arrest for
Domestic Violence, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 213, 215-16 (1988) (arguing that mandato-
ry arrest "substantially reduces the number of domestic assaults and murders"); Joan
Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?: Analysis and Policy Implications of New
Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 929, 929 (1994) (finding that
arrest is the superior method of deterring future violence). Numerous commentators
have also criticized mandatory arrest policies. See, e.g., Miriam H. Ruttenberg, Note,
A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race and Gender in Do-
mestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 171, 171-74, 187-94 (1994) (arguing
that mandatory arrest supports a white, middle-class woman's model of criminal in-
tervention and fails to take into account the racist effects of such policies); Donna
M. Welch, Comment, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or Perpetuation
of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1133-34, 1156-64 (1994) (arguing
that mandatory arrest laws are "neither feasible nor desirable in Chicago").
5. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 2, at 1865-66; Mills, supra note 2, at 187-92;
Neisser, supra note 2, at 248-51; Malinda L. Seymore, Isn't It a Crime: Feminist
Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1032,
1070-83 (1996); Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domes-
tic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
853, 873-80 (1994).
6. For a discussion of sentencing, see Leonore M.J. Simon, A Therapeutic Juris-
prudence Approach to the Legal Processing of Domestic Violence Cases, 1 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POLY & L. 43, 73-75 (1995); Stephen B. Reed, Note, The Demise of Ozzie and
Harriet: Effective Punishment of Domestic Abusers, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv.
CONFINEMENT 337, 350-69 (1991); Diane E. Reynolds, Note, The Use of Pretrial Di-
version Programs in Spouse Abuse Cases: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 3
OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 415, 416-18, 426-27 (1988).
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punishment for domestic violence offenders is misguided. First,
empirical data have not shown that most domestic abusers
can be rehabilitated through treatment programs as they are
currently designed. Rather, the criminal justice system's reli-
ance on batterer treatment programs is driven by politics, not
science. Second, the politics of punishment in these cases are
symptomatic of a greater debate among both practitioners and
academics as to who can provide the "right answer" to why
men abuse women and what the best legal response ought to
be. Third, we need better interdisciplinary research that exam-
ines the causes of violent behavior, paying closer attention to
the differences as well as to the similarities among men who
abuse women. Finally, until we have this better and more
nuanced understanding, the criminal justice system must ex-
plore sentencing alternatives that condemn intimate violence
more generally, while at the same time impose sentences that
specifically deter the most violent offenders, given the particu-
lars of each case, rather than over-rely on therapeutic sentenc-
es, which are currently the trend.
As a former domestic violence prosecutor, I was continually
frustrated with the unwillingness of judges to sentence domes-
tic violence offenders to incarceration, opting most often for
batterer treatment as a condition of probation. A commitment
to gender equality originally brought me to work on women
abuse.7 To me, the emphasis on treatment over punishment
reflected a historically sexist system that treated domestic
violence as a private family matter. Low sentences equated to
gender bias. I blamed the judge.
Yet, at the same time, I found myself recommending proba-
tion with a condition of attending a batterer treatment pro-
gram in cases that, had they involved a stranger, I would
7. Although male violence against women is the only focus of this Article, the
more nuanced understanding of what leads people to be violent might also aid in
understanding other forms of abuse, such as elder abuse, abuse between same sex
couples, and child abuse. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality:
Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 520, 547 (1992) (arguing that examining gay and lesbian battering and elder
abuse would allow feminist theorists to explore the themes of power and control in
contexts outside of heterosexual relationships).
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have recommended a prison term without hesitation. I justi-
fied my sentencing recommendations on the wishes of the
victim or the likelihood of obtaining a plea if I recommended
jail. My commitment to holding abusive men criminally re-
sponsible for their behavior often faltered, particularly at sen-
tencing.
In an attempt to make greater sense of sentencing practic-
es in these cases, I found the absence of legal scholarship
about punishment puzzling. Popular media abounds with
stories like the Gonzalez case.' Pressure mounts on district
attorneys and judges to handle domestic violence cases with
greater sensitivity and understanding.' Debate continues
about domestic violence arrest" and prosecution policies."
Sentencing of other crimes, particularly sex 2 and drug offens-
8. See, e.g., Mareva Brown, Victims of Abuse Often Left In Danger, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Oct. 26, 1997, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File; Michael
A. Fuoco, Victim Ok'd Freeing Jailed Husband; Accused Rapist, Now Homicide Sus-
pect, Was Released Only After Wife Agreed to Plan, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept.
12, 1997, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File; Margaret Ramirez,
Cops: Wife Killer Had Prior Arrests, NEWSDAY (New York) Nov. 3, 1996, at A26,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
9. Judge Robert E. Cahill, a Baltimore County district judge, came under fire
in 1994 for comments made during the sentencing trial for Kenneth Peacock. See
Karl Vick, Md. Judge Taking Heat in Cuckolded Killer Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 30,
1994, at Al. In February, 1994, Kenneth Peacock returned home unexpectedly to
find his wife in bed with another man. See id. Four hours later, he shot her in the
head with a shotgun. See id. On October 17, 1994, Judge Cahill sentenced Mr. Pea-
cock to eighteen months in jail for murdering his spouse. See id. The judge con-
doned his violent outburst and said, "I seriously wonder how many married men,
married five years or four years, would have the strength to walk away... without
inflicting some corporal punishment." Id. Judge Cahill sentenced Peacock to three
years, half of it suspended. See id.
In 1987 a Chinese man in California received five years probation for beating
his wife to death with a claw hammer. See Tamar Lewin, Why Courts See Passion
as an Excuse For Murder, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Oct. 30, 1994, at B1, available in
1994 WL 7616079. He received this sentence because, given his cultural background,
he had to kill her once she confessed to adultery. See id.
10. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
12. See Lita Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 3, 25 (1989) (suggesting that sex offenders continue to offend even after incar-
ceration or clinical treatment); Cheryl Hanna, Living With Risk: The American Expe-
rience with Sex Offender Legislation, 46 U.N.B. L.J. 153, 153-58 (1997); Michele L.
Earl-Hubbard, Comment, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment,
Liberty Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws
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es, receives enormous attention. Why then have legal scholars
written so little about the merger of punishment and domestic
violence?
One might assume that the field of domestic violence and
crime is too new for meaningful scholarship on punishment to
yet evolve. Upon closer examination, however, I conclude that
the silence subverts a more difficult issue of control-not control
of the victim by the abuser-but control over the solution to do-
mestic violence.
A deep and growing schism exists between feminist lawyers
and advocates, who are largely responsible for legal reform in
this area, and social scientists who continue to research this
phenomenon. 4 Debate centers around the causes and cures of
domestic violence. Feminist theory continues to be rich, dynam-
ic, and often contradictory in its conclusions; 5 yet, the unequal
of the 1990s, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 788, 789-90 (1996); Note, Prevention Versus Pun-
ishment: Toward a Principled Distinction in the Restraint of Released Sex Offenders,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1712-13 (1996) (describing typical sex offender statutes); G.
Scott Rafshoon, Comment, Community Notification of Sex Offenders: Issues of Punish-
ment, Privacy and Due Process, 44 EMORY L.J. 1633, 1636-43 (1995); Joel B. Rudin,
Megan's Law: Can It Stop Sexual Predators-and at What Cost to Constitutional
Rights?, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1996, at 3, 3-4.
13. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1283, 1283-85 (1995); Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The
Incarceration Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REV. 335, 343-56, 372-81 (1995); Karen Lutjen,
Note, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 389, 395-402 (1996); Philip Oliss, Comment, Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, The Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63
U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1851-55 (1995); Book Note, Determinate Sentencing and Judi-
cial Participation in Democratic Punishment, 108 HARV. L. REv. 947, 949-50 (1995).
14. I do not suggest that feminism and social science are mutually exclusive dis-
ciplines. There are many feminist social scientists. I use this rough distinction to re-
fer to nonfeminist-oriented social science.
15. For example, the formal equality approach proposes that individuals who are
alike should be treated alike according to their actual characteristics rather than
stereotypes. See Mary Becker, Four Feminist Theoretical Approaches and the Double
Bind of Surrogacy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 303, 303 (1993). In contrast, substantive
equality theory requires that rules take into account the significant differences in
the characteristics and circumstances of women and men in order to avoid gender-
based outcomes and relies on the idea that neutral rules do not account adequately
for the extent to which the realities of women's lives differ from men's. See Herma
Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
1, 26 (1985); Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy:
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power relationship between men and women is the common
thread that runs through feminist discourse on domestic vio-
lence. 6 Feminism is the primary paradigm that explains why
women constitute the vast majority of domestic violence victims.
In contrast, the social science community traces domestic vio-
lence to a violent culture that manifests itself in family conflict
and violence.'7 Social scientists respond that the feminist pri-
mary emphasis on gender does not explain why so few, as op-
posed to so many, men batter, nor does it account for why wom-
en also engage in violence against family members.'" Some psy-
Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 513, 537 (1983).
Nonsubordination theory, initially developed by Catharine MacKinnon as a way
to understand sexual harassment in the work place, shifts the focus of attention
from gender-based differences to the power imbalances between men and women. See
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 40-45 (1987).
Different voice theory views women's differences not as problematic, but as po-
tentially valuable resources that might serve as an alternative to "male" models of
social organization and law. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist The-
ory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 3, 18-19 (1988). These female characteristics could
be incorporated into legal concepts so that, for example, tort law would begin with a
"premise of responsibility rather than rights." Id. at 31.
Finally, some feminist theory is critical of the tendency to produce universalisms
instead of accounting for differences among women. See Martha Minow, Feminist
Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 47, 56, 59-60 (1988).
16. For example, the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
Title IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 and 42
U.S.C.), controversial because of its feminist origins, relies on the view that "crimes
motivated by the victim's gender constitute bias crimes in violation of the victim's
right to be free from discrimination on the basis of gender." S. REP. No. 102-197, at
27 (1991); see 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994); Sally Goldfarb, The Civil Rights Remedy
of the Violence Against Women Act: Legislative History, Policy Implications and Liti-
gation Strategy, 4 J.L. & POLY 391, 391-93 (1996) (panel discussion); Reva B. Siegal,
"The Rule of Love:" Wife Beating As Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117,
2197 (1996). To restructure society and reduce violence against women, feminist legal
reforms have focused on providing women with greater access to the legal system.
These reforms have included the greater availability of orders of protection, the pas-
sage of stalking laws, divorce and custody legislation that recognizes the existence of
domestic violence, and tort and civil rights remedies under the Violence Against
Women Act. See, e.g., infra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Richard J. Gelles, Through a Sociological Lens: Social Structure and
Family Violence, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAmLY VIOLENCE 31, 34-36, 43 (Rich-
ard J. Gelles & Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993) [hereinafter CURRENT CONTROVERSIES].
18. See, e.g., DONALD G. DUTTON WITH SUSAN K. GOLANT, THE BATrERER: A PsY-
CHOLOGICAL PROFILE 120-22 (1995); RicHARD J. GELLES & MURRAY A. STRAuS, INTI-
MATE VIOLENCE 40-41, 49 (1988) (discussing exaggeration of battering estimates and
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chologists locate the causes of domestic violence in individual
pathologies, rather than in larger social structures. 9 Behavior-
al biologists and evolutionary psychologists argue that male
violence against women is deeply rooted in reproductive strate-
gies particularly aimed at controlling women's sexuality, and
thus we need to understand the biological, as well as social,
causes of intimate violence. °
When neither empirical data nor individual experience sup-
ports theoretical arguments, a tendency exists for each discipline
to reject outright the arguments of the other.2' As Kersti Y116
argues: "Feminist scholars and activists with strong convictions
are labeled ideologues .... At the same time, feminists deepen
the chasm by dismissing nonfeminist insights too quickly and
hastily deciding who 'gets it' and who doesn't."2 What is hap-
pening in the domestic violence field is analogous to the parable
of the blind men touching the elephant. Each discipline not only
feels something different, but also claims to possess what it
touches. We blindly hold on to our own piece of the elephant
without fully appreciating how difficult a creature it is to grasp.
No single theoretical construct can account for the violence
that afflicts women in their intimate relationships. Nor can any
single course of punishment provide a perfect solution. In fact,
our search for a perfect solution may have become counterpro-
the fact that not all abused persons abuse); see also RICHARD J. GELLES, THE VIO-
LENT HOME (1972) (arguing that violence in the family is a significant phenomenon
and that women, as well as men, engage in family violence).
19. See, e.g., DUTTON WITH GOLANT, supra note 18, at 120-22; LENORE E. WALK-
ER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 42-43 (1979); Carolie J. Coates & Deborah J. Leong, A
Psychosocial Approach to Family Violence: Application of Conceptual Systems Theory,
in VIOLENCE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 177, 179-80, 197-98 (Gordon W. Russell ed.,
1988).
20. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, Can a Biological Inquiry Help Reduce Male Violence
Against Females?, 22 VT. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998); Barbara Smuts, Male Aggres-
sion Against Women: An Evolutionary Perspective, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT. EVOLU-
TIONARY AND FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 231 (David M. Buss & Neil M. Malamuth eds.,
1996).
21. See, e.g., Zorza, supra note 4, at 929-32. Feminists are willing to accept so-
cial science research when it supports a politically useful proposition, as in the case
of the battered women's syndrome. See id. at 932-33. For a general discussion of
this phenomenon, see CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 17, at xiv-xvii.
22. Kersti A. Y116, Through a Feminist Lens: Power, Gender and Violence, in
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 17, at 47, 59.
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ductive. Those of us who work in this field must base sentencing
policy and decisions on both empirical data and descriptive in-
formation provided by those who "do law."' Our propositions
must be tested by their consequences.' A discussion of punish-
ment in domestic violence criminal cases presents an opportuni-
ty for feminists, social scientists, and researchers from other
fields to develop interdisciplinary insights into the phenomenon
of battering. To do so, however, we each have to relinquish own-
ership of the problem. In turn, it is my hope that sentencing
practices will emerge that actually deliver the promise of pun-
ishment.
Part I of this Article reviews current sentencing practices in
domestic violence cases.' Despite increased attention to domes-
tic violence, there is still a deep reluctance to incarcerate domestic
violence offenders. Rather, most receive probation with mandated
treatment regardless of the severity of the offense or their past
violent histories. This trend continues despite empirical research
23. I have found much inspiration from pragmatist theory. One joy of being a
pragmatist means never having to say that you have a theory. See J.M. Balkin, The
Top Ten Reasons to Be a Legal Pragmatist, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 351, 351 (1991).
Balkin points out that a legal pragmatist "can also be (a) a civic republican, (b) a
feminist, c) a deconstructionist, (d) a case-cruncher, (e) a crit, (f) a law-and-eco-
nomics type, or (g) anything else." Id.
Professor Margaret Jane Radin's article, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990), continues to be one of the most influential pieces that I
have read in the course of my scholarship on domestic violence. Her merger of femi-
nism and pragmatism has assisted me greatly in addressing the dilemmas posed by
criminal domestic violence practice. I strongly urge those interested in the benefits of
pragmatism for feminists to read this piece. Also, I recommend Mari J. Matsuda,
Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763
(1990); Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597
(1990); Schneider, supra note 7.
24. See Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1653, 1660 (1990).
25. I use the term "domestic violence" to refer to acts of violence perpetrated by
men against their girlfriends, wives, or intimate partners. This definition reflects the
fact that women are about six times more likely than men to experience violence
committed by an intimate. See RONET BACHIMA & LINDA E. SALZMAN, U.S. DEPT OF
JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTMIATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY 1
(1995). Furthermore, I tend to use the term "victim" most frequently to describe
women who have been battered by their partners. Although I am sensitive to terms
like 'survivor" and "battered woman," I. use victim here because I do not want to
obscure the reality that women are harmed by intimate violence.
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that questions whether there is any direct causal link between
participation in a batterer treatment program and recidivism.
Part II explores both the theoretical and practical reasons
that have led to the emphasis on treatment over other forms of
punishment. Many argue that sexist attitudes on the part of
prosecutors and judges have led to disproportionately low sen-
tences. This is partly true, but feminists are also responsible for
the overemphasis on treatment. Furthermore, I explore the prac-
tical difficulties that often prevent even the most enlightened
from imposing severe, yet appropriate sanctions.
Part III argues that there is no such thing as a "batterer pro-
file." I draw from the emerging social science literature that sug-
gests that men who abuse women do not have uniform charac-
teristics or motivations. This research can help us better decide
who is most likely to benefit from treatment and who is most
deserving of long-term incapacitation. I then suggest practical
measures for the criminal justice system to develop better, al-
though imperfect, sentencing practices.
Part IV concludes with an optimistic but cautionary note that
the most effective way to reduce violence against women is to
continue to study male battering and base our sentencing deci-
sions on both theory and experience. Finally, we need to accept
the limitations of any criminal justice strategy. This is, perhaps,
the greatest challenge of all.
I. A CRITICAL LOOK AT SENTENCING PRACTICES: THE
DISCONNECTION BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND REALITY
A. The Criminalization of Domestic Violence
The criminalization of domestic violence26 has made for some
strange bedfellows, albeit with different long-term expectations.
Feminists argue that criminalization of domestic violence is one
way to correct the historical, legal, and moral disparities in legal
protections afforded to women, making public what traditionally
has been thought of as a private crime." Victims' advocates focus
26. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV,
108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
27. See Seymore, supra note 5, at 1035-36, 1080-83; Zorza, supra note 4, at 984-
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primarily on individual victim safety, supporting criminalization
generally but arguing against any policies that might increase
danger to the victim or "disempower" her. 8 Criminologists29
and some legal scholars"0 evaluate current polices almost exclu-
sively on their specific deterrent effects, often ignoring changes in
social and legal institutions that feminists have sought to
achieve. 1 Finally, social conservatives, not normally supportive
of feminist legal reform, advocate using the law to enforce public
morality and further the goals of retribution. 2 They too have
been supportive of criminal justice reforms in this area.
86; see also Demie Kurtz, Battering and the Criminal Justice System: A Feminist
View, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 21 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992) (de-
scribing a feminist view of criminalization).
28. See Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: De-
veloping Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive
Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 136 (1991) (discussing victims' advocates'
views that compelling victims to testify has the effect of punishing the victim for the
abuse); David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal Prosecution of Wife As-
saulters, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION
127, 157 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) (finding that mandatory prosecution policies may
cause more harm than good); Mills, supra note 2, at 184 (spurning mandatory prose-
cution policies and advocating a flexible prosecution strategy in order to "facilitate
the battered woman's ability to recapture her identity"); David M. Zlotnick, Empow-
ering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil
Protection Orders, 56 OHIo ST. L.J. 1153, 1207-13 (1995) (arguing that
overcriminalization of domestic violence disempowers victims).
29. See Richard A. Berk et al., The Deterrent Effect of Arrest in Incidents of
Domestic Violence: A Bayesian Analysis of Four Field Experiments, 57 AM. SOC. REV.
698 (1992) (discussing the results of experiments evaluating the deterrent effect of
arrest in domestic assault cases); Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, POLIE FOUND. REP., Apr. 1984, at 1
(same); Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of
Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 261 (1984) [hereinafter Sherman &
Berk, Specific Deterrent Effects] (studying the deterrent effect of arrest in domestic
assault cases); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Con-
formity: Legal and Informal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 AM. Soc. REV. 680
(1992) (studying the effect of arrest on recidivism in domestic violence cases); cf Pe-
ter K. Manning, The Preventive Conceit: The Black Box in Market Context, in DO
ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 3, at 83, 83-84 (arguing that
a belief in the deterrent effects of arrest is a "conceit" because it is a mental activi-
ty organized by a misguided metaphor that animates policy and research).
30. See Zlotnick, supra note 28, at 1171-76, 1212-13.
31. See, e.g., Sherman & Berk, Specific Deterrent Effects, supra note 29, at 268-
70.
32. See FAGAN, supra note 3, at 8-9.
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The federal government also endorses the criminalization of
domestic violence. The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)33
advocates mandatory arrest and pro-prosecution policies,'
training for court personnel and judges, 5 better record keeping
of statistics, 6 and an increased commitment to victims' services
and rehabilitation."7 VAWA also makes certain domestic vio-
lence offenses federal crimes, such as interstate stalking and
violation of a protection order.
38
One major concern with the criminalization movement is that
evidentiary standards for proving abuse have been so relaxed
that any man who stands accused is considered guilty. For ex-
ample, in Florida, Judges Margaret Waller and Carol Draper
require treatment for domestic violence as a condition of bail for
almost everyone accused of the crime.39 The Florida ACLU is
concerned that such pretrial conditions assume guilt without
further proof, thus violating the presumption of innocence.4 °
Both battered women's advocates and opponents of legal re-
form have been criticized for exaggerating or misrepresenting
33. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108
Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796bh to hh-4 (1994).
35. See id. §§ 13992, 14001, 14036.
36. See id. §§ 13962, 14015, 14031, 14038.
37. See id. §§ 3796gg to gg-5, 13941, 13943, 14012, 14013, 14014.
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994). The VAWA criminal provisions are part of a
larger trend to federalize the criminal law, including sex, drug, and gun violations. I
applaud the funds that VAWA currently provides states to combat domestic violence
at the local level, see Cheryl Hanna, Making Hard Decisions After the Violence
Against Women Act Grants, VT. B.J., NovJDec. 1996, at 33, but I share Sanford
Kadish's concerns about the overfederalization of these offenses. See Sanford H.
Kadish, Comment: The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1247 (1995). In
particular, I am less optimistic about the ability of federal law enforcement to do
"the kind of on-site policing that the federal criminal system has never been any
good at." Id. at 1249. Federalizing domestic violence crimes caters to public senti-
ment to "get tougher"; it is likely to distract attention away from local law enforce-
ment, duplicating and wasting resources and not much else.
This Article addresses only sentencing in criminal cases. For a discussion of
civil protection orders, no-contact provisions, and other civil remedies available to
women, see PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION,
CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 33-47 (1990).
39. See Henry Pierson Curtis, County Judges Accused of Abusing Rights in Vio-
lence Cases, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 30, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 9701888.
40. See id.
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the incidence and prevalence of domestic violence.4' Although
the tone of these exchanges fuels the battle for ownership of the
problem, the substance is well taken. As the recent report to
Congress on Domestic and Sexual Violence Data Collection
states: "As we seize the opportunity to make a difference in the
lives of women and children victimized by violence, we want to
be sure,to proceed on the basis of knowledge. We need sound
data to guide our policymaking.4
Unfortunately, we know surprisingly little about the outcomes
of all violent crimes. Few studies compare the outcome of domes-
tic violence with other violent offenses.4" Furthermore, sparse
41. See, e.g., CHRISTANA HOFF SOMMERS, WHO STOLE FEMINISM? 12-17 (1994)
(criticizing unfounded claims of domestic violence advocates that domestic violence is
responsible for more birth defects than all other causes combined and that incidence
of domestic battery tended to rise by 40% during the Super Bowl). Sommers argues
that when feminists engage in "exaggeration, oversimplification, and obfuscation,
[they] may be no different from such other advocacy groups as the National Rifle
Association or the tobacco industry." Id. at 15.
For another prime example of the ongoing battle over statistics, see Liz Kates,
Wife Beating (last modified Oct. 4, 1994) <httpv/www.vix.com/men/battery/stud-
iesalkates.html>' Joel Schwartz, A Reply to Liz Kates on Domestic Abuse (last modi-
fied Oct. 17, 1994) <http:llwww.vix.com/men/battery/studies/schwartz-counter.html>.
42. JUSTICE RESEARCH AND STATISTICS ASS'N, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE DOMES-
TIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE DATA COLLECTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 1 (1996) [hereinafter DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIo-
LENCE].
43. Here is what we do know: There are two official federal measures of crime,
the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) and the Uniform Crime Reports
(UCR). The first consists of interviews from approximately 50,000 housing units and
100,000 persons. See BACEMAN & SALZMAN, supra note 25, at 6-7. All members of a
selected household are interviewed every six months for three years. See id. Al-
though problems remain with this source of data collection, the NCVS reports that
in 1992-93 women reported about 3.8 million assaults to National Crime Victimiza-
tion Surveyors. See id. at 2. In 29% of those cases, the offender was an "inti-
mate"-a husband, ex-husband, boyfriend, or ex-boyfriend. See id. at 3. In other
words, 9 in 1000, or approximately one million women, report being the victim of
domestic violence each year. See id.
We do not have an official measure of how many of those self-reported cases
actually make it into the criminal process. The UCR published by the FBI does not
require local law enforcement to maintain data on the relationship between victim
and offender except in the case of murder. See DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE,
supra note 42, at 4. In 1995, for those cases where the relationship between the
victim and the perpetrator was known, 732 women were murdered by their hus-
bands, and 482 were murdered by their boyfriends. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVES-
TIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 19 (1995), [hereinafter
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data exists on the number of domestic violence cases that arrive
in the criminal justice system and what happens to them once
they get there." The federal government and a majority of the
states collect statistics on domestic violence, but there are wide
variations in how each jurisdiction defines offenses, determines
what is counted, and measures or reports incidents.45 All fifty
states now allow police officers to make warrantless arrests upon
probable cause that someone committed a domestic violence mis-
demeanor or violated a restraining order.46 Most jurisdictions
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1995]. This represents a decrease from 1994, when 823
women were murdered by their husbands, and 525 were murdered by their boy-
friends. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 19 (1994). Among all female murder victims, 26% were slain by a
husband or boyfriend. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1995, supra, at 17.
In 1996, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that there were 1,842 mur-
ders committed by current or former spouses, boyfriends or girlfriends. See George
Lardner, Jr., Unanswered Questions: A Study of Murders by Intimates Fails to Re-
veal Why the Victims Increasingly Are Women, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1998 (National
Weekly Edition), at 35. Although this represents a drop of 36% from the 2,957 such
homicides committed in 1976, the study found that the percentage of women killed
by intimates remained steady, at about 30% of all female homicide victims. See id.
The study further estimates that there were 840,000 female victims of violence
inflicted by an intimate in 1996, compared with 1.1 million in 1993. See id.
Interestingly, these numbers differ dramatically from a recent study done by the
New York City Department of Health. In order to better understand the patterns in
homicide of women, the Department studied the medical examiner records of all
women ages 16 and older killed in New York City between 1990 and 1994. See SU-
SAN A. WILT ET AL., NEW YORK CITY DEP'T OF HEALTH INJURY PREVENTION PRO-
GRAM: FEMALE HOMICIDE VICTIMS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1990-1994 (1997). The
perpetrator's relationship to the victim was known in 42% of those cases. See id. at
12. Forty-nine percent of these known perpetrators were intimate partners. See id.
In both the UCR and the New York Department of Health study, information on the
perpetrator is gathered from police reports. These studies do not reflect whether
anyone has been convicted of the offense.
The National Incident-Bases Reporting System (NIBRS), authorized under the
Federal Crime Bill of 1995, is aimed at changing the way in which these statistics
are gathered. See DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 4. Until the
new system is in place and refined, however, much of the information about domes-
tic violence criminalization is based on individual jurisdictions. See id. Sadly, neither
the NIBRS nor the NCVS will track case dispositions, including conditions of proba-
tion such as mandated treatment.
44. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1995, supra note 43.
45. See id. at 2-3.
46. See Toni L. Harvey, Student Work, Batterers Beware: West Virginia Responds
to Domestic Violence with the Probable Cause Warrantless Arrest Statute, 97 W. VA.
L. REV. 181, 190 (1994). Alabama and West Virginia, the only two states that did
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have mandatory or preferred arrest policies that require or en-
courage police officers to arrest a suspect at the scene of a domes-
tic violence incident.47 A call to the police for a domestic violence
incident is likely to end in arrest, not mediation,48 regardless of
the victim's wishes. Police departments nationwide report that
domestic violence arrests continue to rise, putting increased pres-
sure on already limited law enforcement resources.49
Prosecutors and judges have numerous disposition options
once a domestic violence case enters the system: outright dis-
missal; pretrial diversion;s° postconviction probation with condi-
not allow for warrantless misdemeanor arrests in 1988, both recently enacted stat-
utes. See ALA. CODE § 15-10-3 (1995); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14 (1996).
47. In jurisdictions with mandatory arrest policies, officers must arrest when
they have probable cause to believe that a domestic violence assault has occurred.
See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIc VIOLENCE: EXPERimENTS
AND DILUMAS 111 (1992). In contrast, jurisdictions with pro- or preferred-arrest pol-
icies encourage officers to arrest but do not require them to do so; these jurisdic-
tions generally use the phrase "should arrest" rather than "shall arrest." See id. at
111-12; WILLIAM L. HART ET AL., U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK
FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE: FINAL REPORT 22-23 (1984); see also Combating Vio-
lence Against Women: Hearing on S. 1720 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 39 (1996) (statement of Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of
Justice) ("[VAWA] will ... distribut[e] $28 million in funding to encourage mandato-
ry arrest policies for the primary aggressor in domestic abuse cases."); Alison
Frankel, Domestic Disaster, AMI. LAW., June 1996, at 55, 56 (reporting that 25 states
already have mandatory arrest policies).
48. Prior to the 1970s, the typical police response to domestic violence was to
mediate the situation. Police advised the husband or boyfriend to "take a walk
around the block" rather than arrest him. See HART ET AL., supra note 47, at 22-23;
UNITED STATES COIMMN ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUmB: BATTERED
WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 12-22 (1982); Joan Zorza, The Crimi-
nal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMNOLOGY 46, 47-48 (1992).
49. See Zorza, supra note 4, at 972 (stating that one-third of police time is spent
responding to domestic disturbance calls, constituting the largest category of calls re-
ceived by the police each year); see also Domestic Violence: Not Just a Family Mat-
ter: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 2 (1994) [hereinafter Domestic Violence Hearing]
(statement of Rep. Charles E. Schumer) ("Domestic assault is the single most fre-
quent form of violence that police encounter, more common than all other forms of
violence combined."); Bettina Boxall & Frederick M. Muir, Prosecutors Taking Harder
Line Toward Spouse Abuse Violence, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1994, at Al (noting that
domestic violence calls to police rose 27% in California between 1989 and 1993, in
partial response to increased law enforcement efforts).
50. Diversion is the channeling of a criminal defendant into a rehabilitative
program instead of the justice system. See Reynolds, supra note 6, at 422-23. This
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tions, including fines; batterer treatment and/or substance abuse
counseling; or incarceration. Prosecution policies nationwide are
becoming more rigorous,5 with many jurisdictions forming spe-
cialized prosecution units and implementing "no-drop" poli-
cies.52 The available data, however, suggests that most of these
cases still end with arrest.53 The reasons for lack of prosecution
will usually halt or suspend the formal criminal proceedings against the alleged per-
petrator in favor of a noncriminal proceeding that, if successful, is the final disposi-
tion of the criminal offense. See id. In most cases, the defendant is never required
to plead guilty. See id.
51. For an overview of current prosecution programs, see Naomi R. Cahn, Inno-
vative Approaches to the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Crimes: An Overview, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 161, 162-77; Naomi R. Cahn & Lisa G.
Lerman, Prosecuting Women Abuse, in WOMAN BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES 95, 97-
109 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991). Several sources also provide useful descriptions of
specific programs. See Asmus et al., supra note 28, at 128-29 (describing the Duluth,
Minnesota prosecution program); Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O'Dell, Stopping the Vio-
lence: The Role of the Police Officer and the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. UNIV. L. REV.
297, 298-304 (1993) (describing the San Diego, California prosecution model).
52. Jurisdictions with aggressive, vertical, or no-drop policies include Alexandria,
Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; Quincy, Massachusetts; Brooklyn, New York; Denver,
Colorado; Duluth, Minnesota; King County, Washington; Los Angeles, California; and
San Diego, California. See Cahn & Lerman, supra note 51, at 162-64; Gwinn, supra
note 3, at 19. At least four states have adopted legislation encouraging the use of
no-drop policies. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.2901(2) (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
611A.0311(2)(5) (West Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.7(1)(e) (Supp. 1997);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.075(7)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
In addition, specialized prosecution units are being established throughout the
country. See Calm & Lerman, supra note 51, at 164; Frankel, supra note 47, at 56;
Gwinn, supra note 3, at 17; see also Mark Hansen, New Strategy in Battering Cases,
A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 14 (reporting that in San Diego, homicides related to do-
mestic violence fell from 30 in 1985 to 7 in 1994, after successful completion of a
no-drop program); Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, §
6 (Magazine), at 22 (finding that many more cases are prosecuted under hard no-
drop policies). For a discussion of these trends and an argument that the criminal
justice system needs to adopt reforms that incorporate a feminist perspective on bat-
tering, see Kurtz, supra note 27, at 26.
53. See Domestic Violence Hearing, supra note 49, at 2 (statement of Rep.
Charles E. Schumer) ("In a case where a mugger might be sentenced to a lengthy
jail term, a wife beater may not even be arrested."); Zorza, supra note 4, at 947-54
(citing the Milwaukee replication of the Duluth experiment and finding that only 37
of the 802 domestic violence offenders (.05%) were ever charged, and only 11 of the
802 (.01%) were ever convicted, results similar to those in Charlotte, where fewer
than 1% of abusers spent any time in jail, other than during the initial arrest); see
also Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Under-
standing the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 299 (1985) (find-
ing that "liln any other context, irrefutable evidence of such severe physical and
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are many: victim reluctance or refusal to cooperate; lack of prop-
er police investigation; prosecutors untrained in how to proceed
without the victim's testimony; and the belief that these cases
are a private family matter.'" Of those cases that are prosecut-
ed, many are charged or pled down to misdemeanors despite
facts that suggest the conduct constituted a felony."
psychological damage would cause an outraged demand for legal action"). What little
data there is in this area suggests that prosecutors dismiss the vast majority of do-
mestic violence cases before trial. See, e.g., MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE
FOR GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT (1989), reprinted in 15 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 825, 883-84 (1989) (describing a six-jurisdiction study in which
none of the 224 domestic violence cases reviewed went to trial because all were dis-
posed of by either dismissal or a guilty plea); Rhea Mandulo, Programs Aim at
Keeping Abuse Cases Alive, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 6, 1993, at 2 (reporting that prosecutors
in Manhattan and the Bronx drop 50 to 80% of domestic violence cases); Mary
Ofloherty, New Jefferson Wife-Abuse Unit to Make Cases Tough to Drop, COURIER J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 26, 1991, at 1A, available in 1991 WL 6850310 (citing a 70%
dismissal rate for a local jurisdiction that made no special effort to prosecute domes-
tic violence cases).
54. See Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction to DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
supra note 27, at vii, xvii ("[P]rosecutors have consciously assumed that the motiva-
tion and commitment of victims is a legitimate case discriminator in deciding wheth-
er to prosecute an offender.'); Hanna, supra note 2, at 1860; Janell Schmidt & Ellen
Hochstedler Steury, Prosecutorial Discretion in Filing Charges in Domestic Violence
Cases, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 487, 500 (1989) ("Decisions short of formal charging
were . . .made in cases in which the burden of proof could conceivably be met, but
the victim expressed a desire for the prosecutor to be lenient."); Wangberg, supra
note 3, at 8, 8 ("High case attrition rates in domestic violence actions can generally
be classified under the . . . rubric of 'victim reluctance.'").
55. See Guns and Domestic Violence Change to Ownership Ban: Hearings on H.R.
26 and 445 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Donna F. Edwards, Ex-
ecutive Director, National Network to End Domestic Violence) (finding that "to the
extent criminal charges result in a domestic violence incident, it is likely to be
charged and prosecuted as a misdemeanor crime"), available in 1997 WL 8219577;
Domestic Violence Hearing, supra note 49, at 2 (statement of Rep. Charles E.
Schumer) ("According to one study, as many as 90 percent of all family violence de-
fendants are never prosecuted, and one-third of the cases that would be considered
felonies if committed by strangers are charged as misdemeanors when committed by
nonstrangers."); REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY BIAS
COMMISSION (1990), reprinted in 42 FLA. L. REV. 803, 859-60 (1990); Leonore M.J.
Simon, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to the Legal Reasoning of Domestic
Violence Cases, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 43, 74 (1995) (finding that most re-
search indicates that "stranger offenders fare worse than nonstranger offenders in
sentencing outcome"); see also Sarah Eaton & Ariella Hyman, The Domestic Violence
Component of the New York Task Force Report on Women in the Courts: An Evalua-
tion and Assessment of New York City Courts, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 391, 461-62
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When prosecutors decide to go forward, the final disposition is
often a period of probation, either pre- or postconviction, contin-
gent upon completion of a batterer treatment program. 6 For
example, in Sussex County, New Jersey, counseling and other
social services for both the victim and the abuser, rather than
jail time, is the preferred sentence as a matter of jurisdictional
(1992) (citing criticism of prosecutors for reducing or minimizing charges in too many
cases); Boxall & Muir, supra note 49, at Al (quoting Gil Garcetti, Los Angeles Coun-
ty District Attorney, stating that his office's misdemeanor filing rate is too high); Re-
ne Lynch, Spousal Abuse Is Rarely Prosecuted as a Felony in O.C., L.A. TIMES, June
26, 1994, at Al (finding that a significant number of domestic violence cases that
start as felony arrests eventually are reduced to misdemeanors). According to Cali-
fornia state figures, prosecutors file 80% of Los Angeles County's spouse abuse cases
as misdemeanors. See Boxall & Muir, supra note 49, at Al.
56. Treatment has become an "all-purpose sentence" in the eyes of many judges.
Frankel, supra note 47, at 67; see Gwinn, supra note 3, at 17; Elena Salzman, The
Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention Program: A Model Legal Frame-
work for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REV. 329, 348-49 (1994).
In domestic violence cases, prosecutors are more likely to seek probation or spe-
cial diversion programs than to seek jail sentences. See, e.g., Laura Lippman, More
Action Urged on Domestic Crime, THE SUN (Baltimore), May 28, 1993, at iB, avail-
able in 1993 WL 7367057 (reporting the findings of the Baltimore Domestic Violence
Coordinating Committee that only about three percent of the 20,000 domestic vio-
lence complaints received by the police during the first three months of 1993 ended
with an arrest). Diversion programs, which often include mandated counseling, can
be entered into either pretrial or post-trial. See generally David Adams, Treatment
Models of Men Who Batter: A Profeminist Analysis, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
WIFE ABUSE 176 (Kersti Y116 & Michele Bograd eds., 1988) (explicating a "profemi-
nist analysis" of batterer's treatment programs); L. Kevin Hamberger & James E.
Hastings, Court-Mandated Treatment of Men Who Assault Their Partner, in LEGAL
RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT, supra note 28, at 188, 225 (finding that, despite ef-
forts, research about the effectiveness of batterer treatment programs has yielded
few conclusions).
The creation of specialized courts for family violence also assists judges in plac-
ing defendants on probation with treatment requirements rather than incarceration,
sometimes lessening the perception of the dangers of domestic violence. See FAGAN,
supra note 3, at 20-23.
Batterers themselves often do not believe that their sentences are severe
enough. For example, in a national mail survey devised by the American Prosecutors
Research Institute, only five percent of respondents believed that their sentence was
sufficiently severe. See Rebovich, supra note 3, at 186; see also Sharon D.
Herzberger & Noreen L. Channels, Criminal-Justice Processing of Violent and Nonvi-
olent Offenders: The Effects of Familial Relationship to the Victim, in ABUSED AND
BATrERED 63, 70 (Dean D. Knudsen & JoAnn L. Miller eds., 1991) (finding that vio-
lent crimes against family members are handled differently at the bail-setting stage
than the same crimes against unrelated victims and that suspects who are related
to their victims and charged with a violent offense are treated more leniently).
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policy." There is little evidence, however, that probation de-
partments follow up on these orders, allowing many abusers to
slip through the cracks."
In addition, few batterers ever see the inside of a jail cell,
even when convicted of a serious offense.5" A recent American
Lawyer story followed all domestic violence arrests in eleven
jurisdictions on June 18, 1995.'o Of the 140 arrests made in the
eleven communities, 95 never made it to conviction, plea, or ac-
57. See Dennis OLeary, Domestic Violence Prosecutions-The Need for Prospec-
tive, Proactive Prosecutions, THE PROSECUTOR, SeptiOct. 1993, at 17, 19.
58. According to a study in the Bronx, programs that accept court-mandated of-
fenders are supposed to report those who stop attending. See Frankel, supra note
47, at 667. Yet, no one is sure if they actually do. See id. This does not appear to
be a unique phenomenon, see Gwinn, supra note 3, at 21 (calling for better post-
court follow-up), and also can happen when the treatment program is part of a pre-
trial diversion agreement. See Melissa Hooper, Note, When Domestic Violence Di-
version Is No Longer an Option: What to Do with the Female Offender, 11 BERKELEY
WOMEN's L.J. 168, 170-71 (1996) (finding that 54% of the defendants on diversion
had no contact with probation officers for more than four months); see also Rebovich,
supra note 3, at 187 (finding that tracking of probation fulfillment was rare in most
jurisdictions).
59. Few cases report appeals of domestic violence sentences for either downward
departures from regular sentencing guidelines or for reductions in sentences. In the
few cases that have been appealed, courts are beginning to see the dangers of do-
mestic violence and are reversing accordingly. See State v. Huletz, 838 P.2d 1257,
1257-60 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hobbs, 801 P.2d 1028, 1029-31 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1990). Huletz held that the trial courts sentence of 40 hours of community ser-
vice, a fine of $250, and no contact with the victim for a year was too lenient in
light of the fact that the defendant beat his girlfriend so badly that she required
hospital treatment. See Huletz, 838 P.2d at 1260-61. The court found that the sen-
tence was at the low end of the accepted sentencing guidelines for this type of as-
sault, but no mitigating factors warranted the reduction. "[Tihe sentence imposed be-
low fails to satisfy any of the . . . sentencing goals, including the goal of rehabilita-
tion." Id. at 1260. Hobbs held that the trial court's sentence of three months in jail
and one year of community service was not supported by the facts of the case. See
Hobbs, 801 P.2d at 1030-31. The court found that the trial court should not have
counted the ongoing relationship between the victim and the defendant as a mitigat-
ing circumstance justifying downward departure. See id. at 1031.
Other appellate courts, however, continue to treat these cases lightly. See, e.g.,
State v. Powell, 696 So. 2d 789, 790-91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (finding that a twelve-
year suspended sentence for sexual battery of an ex-girlfriend was justified in light
of the fact that the victim did not want her child's father incarcerated and the de-
fendant was amenable to treatment), affd, 703 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1997).
60. See Frankel, supra note 47, at 54, 56. The injuries sustained by the victims
on that day included bruising, lacerations, black eyes, bloody lips, strangulation
marks, burns, stab wounds, and unconsciousness. See id. at 69-73.
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quittal.6" Cases were dismissed even in jurisdictions with
avowed no-drop policies.62 Only sixteen of the forty-four defen-
dants who were convicted or pled no contest served any time;
the vast majority received probation or a suspended sentence,
including one man who sent his wife to the hospital with a bro-
ken nose and a broken rib.63 He received six months' proba-
tion." A man who slapped his wife in the face and tried to stab
her with a kitchen knife received one year, the longest sentence
given on this day.65 The court found that two prior felony drug
convictions, not the severity of the crime, justified the length of
the sentence.66
What would happen to these defendants if they assaulted a
stranger or acquaintance rather than a loved one? Unfortunate-
ly, we do not know. There is an abysmal lack of data comparing
violent domestic and nondomestic cases.6" To date, no empirical
evidence supports the assertion that authorities treat domestic
violence offenses less seriously than other violent crimes. In fact,
Kathleen Ferraro and Tascha Boychuk examined violent crimi-
nal cases in Maricopa County, Arizona from 1987 to 1988 and
found that all people prosecuted for crimes of violence, whether
against an intimate or a nonintimate, received relatively lenient
treatment.68 Offenders closely related by blood or sexual ties to
61. See id. at 56.
62. In Atlanta, 17 of 27 cases were dismissed or not prosecuted; in Dade Coun-
ty, the figure was 13 of 27; in Oakland, California, the number was two out of six.
See id. at 69-73.
63. See id. at 72.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 56, 72.
67. See JoAnn L. Miller, Family Violence Research: Some Basic and Applied
Questions, in ABUSED AND BATWERED, supra note 56, at 5, 13-15 (arguing that estab-
fishing treatment and control groups is ethically problematic but vital for research
on family violence and identifying an urgent need to collect systematic data).
68. See Kathleen J. Ferraro & Tascha Boychuk, The Court's Response to Interper-
sonal Violence: A Comparison of Intimate and Nonintimate Assault, in DOIESTIC VI-
OLENCE, supra note 27, at 209, 219-21. In a review of 104 cases of adult intimates
and 100 cases of nonintimate violent crimes, only two cases resulted in a verdict of
guilty by a jury and one by a judge. See id. at 219. One of the 204 cases resulted
in a verdict of not guilty by a jury trial. See id. A significant difference existed,
however, between the proportion of intimate and nonintimate cases disposed of
through guilty pleas. See id. In addition, courts dismissed a much larger portion of
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their victims were usually given probation or had their cases
dismissed, but so too were offenders unrelated to their vic-
tims.6 9 The authors concluded that nondomestic violence re-
ceives the same treatment as domestic violence."0 "If incarcera-
tion is used as a measure of disapproval, few.., violent acts in
these data are strongly disapproved."7' Given the changes in
arrest and prosecution policies, as well as the increased public
pressure in the ten years since Ferraro and Boychuk conducted
their study, it is just as likely that domestic assault and battery
cases are being treated more seriously than nondomestic assault
and battery cases, even overzealously in some instances.
Social scientists can and should do much better;72 comparison
studies like Ferraro and Boychuk's are not difficult," yet they
are vital. At the same time, feminist activists should not claim
that the criminal justice system treats domestic violence differ-
ently than other violent offenses until we have further proof.
Criminalization rhetoric creates a powerful illusion that the sys-
tem is "getting tough" on violent crime. But many violent offend-
ers appear to be "getting off."
nonintimate cases than intimate ones. See id. For cases actually resulting in a con-
viction, usually through a guilty plea, 43% received probation and only 11% spent
time in jail. See ic at 221.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 223-24.
71. Id. at 224.
72. See, e.g., Murray A. Strauss, Identifying Offenders in Criminal Justice Re-
search on Domestic Violence, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?., supra
note 3, at 14, 17-19 (discussing how the "clinical" population of domestic violence of-
fenders differs from characteristics of the general population who may manifest the
same behavior and describing the "researcher's fallacy" in generalizing from a repre-
sentative sample of a community to a clinical population).
73. See Ferraro & Boychuck, supra note 68, at 210-11. In their study, the re-
searchers relied primarily on computer-generated data and prosecutor files, not vic-
tim or offender interviews. See id. Because this type of research does not place vic-
tims in the same sort of danger that studies using control groups do, there is no
ethical excuse for the lack of comparative research. See infra' notes 121, 131-32 and
accompanying text (discussing ethical dilemmas posed by the use of comparison
groups when evaluating treatment programs).
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B. The Practice of Punishment
In 1984, the Attorney General's Task Force on Family Vio-
lence wrote that "the most successful treatment occurs when
mandated by the criminal justice system."4 Although the re-
port recommended incarceration for serious offenses, it encour-
aged the use of batterer treatment programs in cases where the
injury to the victim was not serious. 75 Most states and the fed-
eral government have since adopted faith in treatment as a
matter of policy. Some states, such as California, Alaska, and
Florida, require courts to order attendance in a treatment pro-
gram as a condition of probation in a domestic violence case.7"
Montana requires an offender convicted of partner assault to
"complete a counseling assessment with a focus on violence,
dangerousness, and chemical dependency."7 Connecticut re-
quires anyone convicted for a lesser family violence offense to
participate in a "family violence education program."75 South
Carolina allows court-ordered counseling for domestic violence
offenses but forbids a court from sentencing the offender to more
than thirty days in jail.79 The VAWA5 also endorses batterer
treatment programs for violations of its criminal provisions."1
Domestic violence offenders can complete a pretrial treatment
program to avoid conviction in some jurisdictions. 2 These pro-
grams are generally not available for other violent offenses. For
example, Louisiana has a pretrial diversion program available
74. HART ET AL., supra note 47, at 49.
75. See id.
76. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.101(1) (Michie 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE §
1203.097(a)(6) (West Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.281 (West 1997).
77. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(4)(a) (1997).
78. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38c(h) (West 1995).
79. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-20, 16-25-60 (Law Co-op Supp. 1996).
80. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108
Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a) (1994) ("The court shall provide, as an explicit condi-
tion of a sentence of probation . . . (4) for a domestic violence crime . . . by a de-
fendant convicted of such an offense for the first time that the defendant attend a
public, private, or private nonprofit offender rehabilitation program .... ").
82. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518B.01 Subd.6(a)(7) (West Supp. 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.481.2(a)
(Michie 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.51(B) (Baldwin 1997); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-36-5.(2)(b) (Supp. 1997).
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only to domestic offenders.' Dade County, Florida has a spe-
cialized domestic violence court that permits pretrial diversion
for first-time offenders if the offenders complete a batterer treat-
ment program."
Some jurisdictions are moving away from pretrial diversion
and instead require a conviction before treatment can be or-
dered.' The rationale for disallowing diversion programs is
that they fail to demand that the batterer acknowledge any
wrongdoing. Drop-out rates are high; once an abuser stops at-
tending, the prosecution rarely obtains a conviction.86
C. A Review of Treatment Programs
Controversy surrounding who should receive treatment and
how it is structured reflects the larger debate between feminists
and social scientists as to the root causes of domestic violence. The
first major dispute centers around whether clinical intervention
should be aimed at both members of the couple or only the
male." Couples therapy relies on the underlying premise that
poor conflict management skills and anger control cause domestic
violence. Both partners are expected to take some responsibility
for their behavior to reduce conflict and avoid violence." Treat-
ment programs in which the male and female participate report
reducing violence between spouses who wish to stay together.89
83. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79 (West Supp. 1997).
84. See Linda Dakis, Dade County's Domestic Violence Plan: An Integrated Ap-
proach, TRIAL, Feb. 1, 1995, at 44, 45; see also FAGAN, supra note 3, at 17 (describ-
ing the Dade County Domestic Violence Court and its emphasis on treatment).
85. In 1995, California repealed its pretrial diversion statute. See CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 1000.6 to 1000.96, repealed by Act of Oct. 5, 1995, ch. 641, 1995 Cal. Legis.
Serv. 3964 (West). Utah does not allow pretrial diversion in domestic violence cases.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.7(6) (Supp. 1997). Michigan requires a guilty plea
before a batterer can enter treatment or probation. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §
769.4(a) (West Supp. 1997).
86. See Gwinn, supra note 3, at 17, 21.
87. See Barry D. Rosenfeld, Court-Ordered Treatment of Spouse Abuse, 12 CLINI-
CAL PSYCHOL. REV. 205, 208 (1992).
88. See, e.g., Peter H. Neidig et al., Domestic Conflict Containment: A Spouse Abuse
Treatment Program, 66 SOC. CAsEwORK 195, 195-97 (1985) (describing the principles
underlying the U.S. Marine Corps' Domestic Conflict Containment Program).
89. See id. (finding that 87% of participants in a highly structured program in the
military for couples who wished to stay together remained violence-free for a four-
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Many have discredited couples therapy because the dominant
paradigm for explaining domestic violence shifted from one of
conflict theory to one of feminist theory;" most court-ordered
treatment programs today treat only men.9' Feminist-informed
treatment resocializes men to be less controlling of women.92
Women need not participate because men are entirely responsi-
ble for their own violent behavior." The reported success rates
of male-only treatment programs have not, however, been vastly
different from programs that treat both spouses."
Furthermore, many states mandate the length of programs
through legislation;" treatment programs of six months to a
year are becoming commonplace. Yet, there is no convincing evi-
dence that the length of a program determines its effective-
ness.96 For example, Jefferey Edleson and Maryann Syers
month period); Carol U. Lindquist et al., Evaluation of Conjugal Violence Treatment
Program: A Pilot Study, 3 BEHAVIORAL COUNSELING & CommUNITY INTERVENTION 76
(1983) (finding that in a nine-week pilot program for couples involved in moderate-
to-mild spouse abuse, several of the couples indicated an improved relationship).
90. But see K. Daniel O'Leary et al., Assessment and Treatment of Partner Abuse:
A Synopsis for the Legal Profession, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1215, 1232 (1995) (advocating
the use of couples treatment in certain situations).
91. See Gwinn, supra note 3, at 21 (noting that most jurisdictions now follow the
Duluth Model, which advocates and uses male-only treatment programs).
92. See generally ELLEN PENCE & MICHAEL PAYMAR, EDUCATION GROUPS FOR MEN
WHO BATTER: THE DULUTH MODEL 1-5 (1993) (describing the philosophy of the Du-
luth Model).
93. See id.
94. See Clyde M. Feldman & Carl A. Ridley, The Etiology and Treatment of Do-
mestic Violence Between Adult Partners, 2 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. SCI. & PRAC. 317, 337
(1995); Rosenfeld, supra note 87, at 208; see also O'Leary et al., supra note 90, at
1232 (concluding that "couples treatment appears very viable, and indeed a preferred
option of both men and women in highly conflictual relationships").
The move away from couples counseling paralleled the move away from media-
tion of domestic violence cases. Others have made similar arguments as to why me-
diation is inappropriate in domestic violence cases. See Reynolds, supra note 6, at
417-18 (finding that the balance of power in most violent relationships conflicts with
the underlying concept of mediation [and couples counseling]-the equal balance of
power between the parties).
95. California and Colorado, for example, require court-mandated programs to be
one year in length. See Gwinn, supra note 3, at 21.
96. A recent five-year study of participants in the Duluth program.found that "[oif
the 100 men included in the sample, 40 were identified as recidivists . . . 22 had
been convicted again for domestic assault, 15 had been the subject of orders for pro-
tection because of domestic assault, and 33 had been police suspects for domestic as-
sault." PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 92, at 166-67 (citing Melanie Shepard, Predict-
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found that in comparing six different group treatment programs
for men who batter, twelve session treatment groups were as
effective as thirty-two session groups in reducing incidents of
violence and terroristic threats at the follow-up period. They
speculate that men in twelve session groups accelerate their ef-
forts to make the greatest use of the shorter amount of time
available.98 Edward Gondolf found similar shortcomings in
"model" 9 programs. Although model programs tend to be longer
in length, larger in number of participants, and confrontational
in treatment modality, they also report higher dropout rates.0 0
In fact, less than fifty percent of men court-ordered to treatment
complete the program in many model jurisdictions.'0 1 This re-
search casts doubt on the policy assumption that longer pro-
grams work better.
Mental health programs that focus on psychotherapy, stress
management, anger control, and conflict resolution are also be-
coming less common. 2 Feminists criticize these models as in-
sufficient to address domestic violence as a social problem em-
ing Batterer Recidivism Five Years After Community Intervention, 7 J. FAM. VIO-
LENCE 167 (1992)).
97. See Jeffrey L. Edleson & Maryann Syers, Relative Effectiveness of Group Treat-
ments for Men Who Batter, SOC. WORK RES. & ABSTRACTS, June 1990, at 16.
98. See id.
99. Gondolf defined a model program as one in operation for more than five years
as a full-time counseling program for batterers that involved regional training and
conducted regular outcome assessments. See Edward W. Gondolf, An Exploratory
Survey of Court-Mandated Batterer Programs, 13 RESPONSE TO VIcTIMIZATION WOM-
EN & CHILDREN 7, 7 (1990). Staff of these programs had extended program visibility
and reputation through conference presentations and/or published papers. See id.
100. See id. at 10; see also Feldman & Ridley, supra note 94, at 337 (reviewing the
30 published studies on the effectiveness of batterer treatment programs and finding
that community-based treatment programs that are shorter in length have signifi-
cantly higher completion rates, independent of treatment modality).
101. See Gondolf, supra note 99, at 10.
102. Note that extreme variance remains in program design. See Jerry Finn, Men's
Domestic Violence Treatment Groups: A Statewide Survey, 8 SOC. WORK WITH
GROUPS 81, 81 (1985); Alan Rosenbaum & Roland D. Maiuro, Perpetrators of Spouse
Abuse, in TREAIZiENT OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 280, 292-301 (Robert T. Ammerman &
Michael Hersen eds., 1990); see also David L. Myers, Eliminating the Battering of
Women By Men: Some Considerations for Behavior Analysis, 28 J. APPLIED BEHAV.
ANALYSIS 493, 500 (1995) (describing the various types of treatment programs imple-
mented by various jurisdictions today, including models based on anger expression,
psychoeducational programs, or profeminist theories of battering).
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bedded in sexist social structures.'
The Duluth, Minnesota model is the prevailing approach uti-
lized by a growing number of jurisdictions.' The Duluth mod-
el philosophy is: "Batterers, like those who intervene to help
them, have been immersed in a culture that supports relation-
ships of dominance. This cultural acceptance of dominance is
rooted in the assumption that, based on differences, some people
have the legitimate right to master others."" 5 The curriculum
uses an educational and counseling approach, as opposed to
anger-control intervention.' ° It focuses on the use of violence
by the batterer to establish power and control over his partner.
Men meet in weekly groups run by a facilitator. The facilitator is
not necessarily a mental health professional but is a trained lay
person. Participants engage in exercises geared towards con-
fronting their violent behavior. For example, each participant
maintains a "control log" or diary that identifies their abusive
behavior."7 Role plays based on individual experiences are
used to build nonviolent skills.' Videotapes, such as Profile of
an Assailant, are shown to prompt discussion."9 Skills such as
taking time-outs and recognizing women's anger are also
taught."0 Most of these exercises preclude discussion of the
particular relationship, instead focusing on the underlying is-
sues of power and control."'
EMERGE in Boston is another popular feminist-inspired
treatment model."' The program considers itself a "collective"
of men working to end violence against women."' Although
trained counselors run the program, sessions are conducted as
103. See Edward W. Gondolf & David Russell, The Case Against Anger Control
Treatment Programs for Batterers, 9 REsPONSE TO VICTIMIZATION WOMEN & CHIL-
DREN 2, 2-5 (1986).
104. See Gwinn, supra note 3, at 21.
105. PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 92, at 3.
106. For a description of the Duluth Model, see id.
107. See id. at 35.
108. See id. at 53-64.
109. See id. at 22.
110. See id. at 56-64.
111. See id. at 64.
112. See EDWARD W. GONDOLF, MEN WHO BATTER: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR
STOPPING WIFE ABUSE 20-22 (1985).
113. See id. at 22.
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supervised self-help groups." EMERGE considers itself to be
part of a movement organizing men to challenge sexism in soci-
ety."5 Battered women's shelters established other programs,
like the House of Ruth in Baltimore and the Domestic Violence
Project in Ann Arbor, Michigan."6 Shelter staff attempt to
monitor both sides of the relationship and oversee both parties
involved."7 Most programs charge the abuser a fee;"' many
will not accept an abuser into their program unless he pleads
guilty and acknowledges the underlying abusive behavior."'
D. The Effectiveness of Batterer Treatment Programs
Empirical research on treatment programs suggests that the
preference for treatment as a disposition to a criminal domestic
violence case is misinformed public policy. 2 ° Lawmakers
should not bow to political pressure to support "feel good" pro-
grams that have yet to be proven effective in the thirteen years
since the Attorney General's Task Force recommended them. An
informed understanding of this research, including its method-
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 19. See generally Myers, supra note 102, at 500 (noting that many
psychoeducational and profeminist programs are adjuncts to battered women's pro-
grams or otherwise have battered women's advocates in substantial leadership roles).
117. Shelter involvement in batterer treatment is part of a trend within the shelter
movement to "treat" abused women rather than using the movement to engage in
political and social reform. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23
CONN. L. REV. 973, 993 (1991) ("Battered women [in shelters] tend now to be posi-
tioned as clients. They are increasingly psychiatrized, addressed as victims with
deep, complicated selves") (quoting Nancy Fraser, Struggle over Needs: Outline of a
Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory of Late-Capitalist Political Culture, in WOMEN, THE
STATE, AND WELFARE 199, 215 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990)).
118. California incorporates a sliding fee schedule based on the batterer's ability to
pay. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.097(C)(1)(P) (West Supp. 1998). Connecticut re-
quires a $200 fee for its family violence education program. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-38c(h) (West 1995). Florida charges for participation in its court-mandat-
ed batterer treatment program because of a systemic belief that payment is impor-
tant to the batterer taking responsibility for his actions. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
741.325(6) (West 1997). Massachusetts imposes a $350 assessment on treatment
program participants on top of the cost of the program. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 209(A) § 10 (West Supp. 1997).
119. See Gwinn, supra note 3, at 21.
120. See Rosenfeld, supra note 87, at 205.
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ological shortcomings, 2' is imperative if we are to make prog-
ress in this area. As David Faigman has argued:
As science, the social sciences can provide the law only mod-
est assistance. Indeed, modesty is a quality that proponents
of social science would do well to exercise. At the same time,
however, the significance of social science research should not
be underestimated, for ultimately it provides a check on the
suppositions of its critics as well as its proponents."
Some available data suggests that court-ordered treatment
correlates to a reduction in physical violence,' although treat-
ment neither terminates violence in many cases nor curbs the
more subtle psychological forms of abuse." Whether treat-
121. In particular, randomly assigning men to treatment or nontreatment alterna-
tives is difficult due to the ethical issues involved. See Edleson & Syers, supra note
97, at 16-17. Furthermore, the choice of outcome criteria to judge a successful pro-
gram is controversial. Numerous studies have found that men underreport their vio-
lence in comparison to their partners' reports. Some studies use victim reports to
measure recidivism; others use official data like arrest records or civil restraining
order files. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 87, at 210; Daniel G. Saunders &
Jennifer C. Parker, Legal Sanctions and Treatment Follow-Through Among Men Who
Batter: A Multi-variate Analysis, Soc. WORK RES. & ABSTRACTS, Sept. 1989, at 23.
In addition, obtaining accurate follow-up data is difficult. "Most empirical stud-
ies have reported outcome data only for those subjects who have completed treat-
ment and/or were available at follow-up." Rosenfeld, supra note 87, at 210. Because
men who experience a beneficial impact from treatment are more likely to respond
to follow-up investigation, they are likely to be overrepresented in outcome data. See
id.
The inclusion and exclusion of certain subjects in these studies are also likely
to skew results. For example, some spouse treatment programs have excluded sub-
jects with alcohol or drug addictions, mental illness, or general lack of motivation.
The elimination of difficult subjects may overestimate the success of many of these
programs. See id. at 211 (collecting studies).
Finally, one of the methodological problems that plagues this research is the
lack of a "base rate of abuse." See id. at 212. Although we assume that men who
abuse will continue to do so unless there is intervention, this certainly is not true
for all men. Whether any involvement with the legal system or court-ordered treat-
ment is successful in reducing the levels of violence is also difficult to gauge. See id.
122. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1095 (1989).
123. See Donald G. Dutton, The Outcome of Court-Mandated Treatment for Wife As-
sault: A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation, 1 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 163 (1986); Michael
Waldo, Relationship Enhancement Counseling Groups for Wife Abusers, 10 J. MENTAL
HEALTH COUNSELING 37, 43-44 (1988)
124. See Jeffrey L. Edleson & Roger J. Grusznski, Treating Men Who Batter: Four
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tion."9 A control group would give researchers confidence that
treatment, not some other variable, such as threat of incarcera-
tion, individual motivation, support from one's partner, social
stigma attached to being labeled an abuser, or other external fac-
tors... is influencing the change in violent behavior. Granted,
establishing control groups to measure the effectiveness of treat-
ment can be troubling. Partaking in research studies could place
victims in danger. 13' Although ethical issues arise when treat-
ment or incarceration results in further injury to the victim, 32
unless these studies have control groups, policymakers and judg-
es will continue to fumble around in the dark, lacking insight into
whether treatment will work with certain offenders. Blind faith in
treatment does not minimize the risks women like Kelly Gonzales
face when their partners remain free to get counseling.
Additionally, study samples are usually too small to apply
conclusions to larger populations. This is particularly troubling
given that most studies that report treatment success only in-
129. See generally FAGAN, supra note 3, at 30-33 (discussing the weaknesses of ex-
isting empirical studies); Simon, supra note 6, at 74 (commenting on the dearth of
research examining the sentencing differential between domestic violence offenders
and stranger offenders).
130. Experiments regarding the effects of arrest on domestic violence raised an im-
portant hypothesis about the interaction of legal and social controls. See Janell D.
Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter Domestic Violence?, in Do AR-
RESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 3, at 43. In these studies, arrest
appears to increase the risk of violence for unmarried and unemployed suspects and
to deter the risk for those married and employed. See id. at 49. Jeffery Fagan re-
ported a similar relationship between the deterrent effects of prosecution and the so-
cial position of the offender. See Jeffrey Fagan, Cessation of Family Violence: Deter-
rence and Dissuasion, in FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 124, at 377, 394.
These results suggest that the offender must have a "stake in conformity" for
legal sanctions to deter behavior. Formal legal sanctions are likely to be more effec-
tive when reinforced by informal social controls. For an overview of "stake in confor-
mity" theories, see Charles R. Tittle & Charles H. Logan, Sanctions and Deviance:
Evidence and Remaining Questions, 7 L. & Soc. REv. 371 (1973).
131. See Miller, supra note 67, at 14-15 (discussing the dilemmas researchers face
when victims of family violence can be put in more jeopardy by participating in
studies and suggesting ways to minimize risks of harm by maximizing informed
consent).
132. See id. at 15 (arguing that "we must imagine the 'what if' question to decide
whether the benefits from the controlled experiment outweigh the potential costs of
denying treatment" and acknowledging the ultimate difficulty in minimizing harms
that result when researching family violence).
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ment itself, or simply individual "motivation" brought on by le-
gal intervention causes the reduction of violence, is unclear. In
fact, some studies have found that men arrested and treated
resume their violent behavior as frequently as do men arrested
and not referred to treatment." Other studies have found no
significant difference in recidivism rates between men who com-
plete batterer treatment and men who drop-out.2 Holding
someone criminally responsible for their actions may be as effec-
tive as any treatment modality.
Additionally, treatment does not work for everybody. For men
ordered by the court to attend treatment, recidivism rates have
been reported as high as fifty-four percent within six months of
completing a treatment program.127 This data might suggest
treatment causes at least some men to change their behavior,
but it is just as likely that men who complete court-ordered
treatment and do not recidivate are the most motivated and
amenable to treatment.
28
The available research is hampered by the lack of a control
group; to date there has been no study that randomly assigned
abusers to incarceration, treatment, or unsupervised proba-
Years of Outcome Data from the Domestic Abuse Project, 12 J. SOC. SERVICE RES. 3
(1988); Edleson & Syers, supra note 97, at 16; Daniel G. Saunders & Sandra T.
Azar, Treatment Programs for Family Violence, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 481, 533 (Lloyd
Onlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989).
125. See Rosenfeld, supra note 87, at 215.
126. See id.
127. See Edleson & Syers, supra note 97, at 14. This statistic is based only on 14
men and thus not statistically significant. The results of other recidivism rates stud-
ies have varied greatly. See Dutton, supra note 123, at 170 (finding slightly over 4%
recidivisim in a study with 50 men and police reports on a four-month treatment
program); Huey-tsyh Chen et al., Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Court Sponsored
Abuser Treatment Program, 4 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 309 (1989) (finding 10% recidivism
over 14 months based on a study of 120 men and police reports on an unknown
treatment program length); L. Kevin Hamberger & James E. Hastings, Skills Train-
ing for Treatment of Spouse Abusers: An Outcome Study, 3 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 121,
126 (1988) (finding approximately 30% recidivism based on a one-year study with
some court-referred and some voluntary); Shepard, supra note 96, at 171 (finding
40% recidivism over five years). For a general discussion on recidivism studies and
domestic violence, see Hamberger & Hastings, supra.
128. See Rosenfeld, supra note 87, at 211 (collecting studies that excluded batterers
based on some characteristic, such as alcohol and/or drug abuse problems, mental ill-
ness, or a general lack of motivation).
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clude subjects who have no substance abuse problems, no psy-
chiatric difficulty, and high motivation. 133 The elimination of
difficult subjects skews results, overstating the success of many
programs.
Finally, treatment programs must be accountable to the pub-
lic. A common and significant problem of data collection arises
when researchers are "aware of the hypothesis being tested and
[are] positioned to affect the cast of the data collected."" This
is likely to occur when treatment staff conduct their own follow-
up studies and report results. Outside independent evaluations
check the biases of self-evaluators to reach results that keep
their programs alive, particularly in the interpretation of the
data. 3 5 For example, Melanie Shepard's independent evalua-
tion of the Duluth program found that of the 100 men included
in the sample, forty percent were identified as recidivists be-
cause they were either convicted of domestic assault, the subject
of a protection order, or a police suspect for a domestic as-
sault.136 Interestingly, this data could be interpreted as proving
the treatment program a success-60 percent of men who com-
plete the program do not recidivate-or unsuccessful in compari-
son to other programs that report better results.3 7 Yet,
Shepard is cautious before drawing any conclusions about the
success of the program given methodological shortcomings and
the considerably longer follow-up period than other studies."1
8
Most important, Shepard concludes: "The results of the
discriminant function indicates [sic] that characteristics of the
batterer were more important in predicting recidivism than was
the form of intervention. 39 In particular, she finds that recidi-
vists were abusive for shorter periods of time prior to their ini-
tial contact with the system. "Men who batter may follow a
133. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 123.
134. Faigman, supra note 122, at 1062.
135. See id.
136. See Shepard, supra note 96 at 173.
137. See id. at 174-75.
138. See id. at 174 (noting that the use of records that underreport rates of vio-
lence, the selection of a sample from only one agency, and the limitations of
stepwise procedures in discriminant analysis present methodological shortcomings to
this study).
139. Id. at 175.
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pattern whereby behavior does not change until there are in-
creasingly high costs or greater risks involved. This may be
analogous to 'hitting bottom' for the alcoholic."' ° Furthermore,
chemical dependency and abuse as a child further contributed to
recidivism.' Only independent evaluators who have no stake
in the outcome of the study can perform such careful analyses.
Whether court-ordered treatment programs are more effec-
tive in reducing violence than traditional forms of punishment,
such as incarceration or probation without treatment, is un-
clear. As Barry Rosenfeld argues: "The old adage 'You can lead
a horse to water but you can't make it drink' may apply to
spouse abuse treatment programs." 42 Treatment may work
for some, but we are a long way from confirming that the
preference for treatment over incarceration is sound policy. "An
answer to the far more complex question of what works best
with whom, under what circumstances, and for what level or
type of violence remains largely unknown.""
This research raises ethical and legal dilemmas for those
who continue to put their punishment eggs in the treatment
basket. Court-mandated treatment in criminal cases may offer
a woman "false hope"" that her partner will be permanently
rehabilitated, when in fact, he may only be deterred in the
short term, and perhaps not at all. This is troubling if, as one
researcher suggests, a woman is most likely to remain with
her abuser if he attends treatment. 45 Violent offenders often
are released without evidence that they are "cured," putting
some women at an increased risk of further injury or
death.' 4
Furthermore, punishment that differs based on the gender
and relationship of the victim to the offender implicates issues
140. Id.
141. See id. at 175-76.
142. Rosenfeld, supra note 87, at 222.
143. Feldman & Ridley, supra note 94, at 337.
144. Gondolf, supra note 99, at 10.
145. See Edward W. Gondolf, Who Are Those Guys?: Toward a Behavioral Typology
of Batterers, 3 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 187, 200 (1980).
146. See generally Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 53-64 (1991) (discussing the phenome-
non of separation assault).
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of equal treatment. 47 As we have seen in the arrest context,
courts may soon look at the preference for probation and treat-
ment for these, but not other violent crimes, as violating state
and federal equal protection and due process laws."
Finally, these programs have received substantial support
from the criminal justice community, states, and the federal
government. 49 The more entrenched these programs become,
the harder they are to change or eliminate.50 Policymakers
must examine whether scarce resources are being well-spent.
Simply exploring the causal relationship between court-ordered
treatment and recidivism rates will likely fuel the battle for
147. This dilemma is analogous to the Tracy Thurman case. See Thurman v. City
of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). Ms. Thurman received a $1.9 mil-
lion settlement from the Torrington Police Department for its policy of noninterven-
tion and nonarrest in domestic violence cases. See Amy Eppler, Note, Battered Wom-
en and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution Help Them When the Po-
lice Won't?, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 795 (1986). On numerous occasions, Ms. Thurman
asked the police to protect her from her estranged husband, but she received little
help. See Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1524. Ultimately, on June 10, 1983, Ms.
Thurman's husband arrived at her home demanding to speak to her. See id. at
1525. Ms. Thurman telephoned the Torrington police, asking that her husband be
arrested on the outstanding warrant for his violation of probation. See id. After 15
minutes, when the police failed to arrive, Ms. Thurman went outside to speak to her
husband. See id. He stabbed her repeatedly in the chest, neck, and throat. See id.
Twenty-five minutes after the police received the call, Officer Frederick Petrovits
arrived and watched Charles Thurman, who was holding a bloody knife, kick his
wife in the head. See id. at 1525-26. The officer continued to do nothing while Mr.
Thurman went into the house, picked up his three-year old son, and dropped him on
his wounded bleeding mother. See id. at 1526. Mr. Thurman then kicked Ms.
Thurman in the head again. See id. It was not until after other officers had arrived
and Ms. Thurman was placed on a stretcher that Mr. Thurman was arrested. See
id. Ms. Thurman successfully alleged that the City of Torrington had a policy of
treating women and children who were assaulted by a man with whom they had a
relationship differently from women and children who were assaulted by strangers.
See id. at 1526-29 (ruling that Ms. Thurman alleged facts in her complaint sufficient
to evidence a pattern or custom of deliberate indifference toward women who were
victims of domestic violence).
148. For a history of litigation surrounding police responses to domestic violence,
see Marvin Zalman, The Court's Response to Police Intervention in Domestic Violence,
in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 27, at 79; see also Developments, supra tote 3, at
1557-74 (discussing equal protection and due process claims brought against state
actors in the domestic violence context and arguing that the use of these legal doc-
trines could be expanded to afford women greater protection).
149. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
150. See Rosenfeld, supra note 87, at 223.
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ownership. Nevertheless, we cannot be afraid to make the
connection between perception and reality.
II. WHO'S TO BLAME?: THE COMPLEX MOTIVATIONS THAT
DRIVE SENTENCING DECISIONS
A. Theories of Punishment and The Privacy of Rehabilitation
In this section, I explore different theories of punishment and
how they relate to domestic violence offenses. Too often, judges and
legal scholars feel compelled to justify punishment on a particular
theory without examining the underlying tensions of those theo-
ries when applied in practice. I argue that rehabilitation, the most
common theoretical rationale for punishing domestic offenders,
disguises the subversive notion that abuse is private and patholog-
ical; embracing rehabilitation will likely destroy the public goals of
criminalization. Nevertheless, although other rationales for pun-
ishment, such as general and specific deterrence, therapeuticjuris-
prudence, incapacitation, and retribution, are not so laden with
notions of privacy, they too are an imperfect fit when applied to
domestic violence. Thus, rather than search for perfect punish-
ment theories, ultimately we should be pragmatic, justifying deci-
sions based on both general policy goals and the particulars of
individual cases.
1. Rehabilitation
Legal distinctions between the public and the private spheres
have justified the lack of state intervention into domestic violence
situations. As Elizabeth Schneider points out:
The concept of male battering of women as a 'private' issue
exerts a powerful ideological pull on our consciousness be-
cause, in some sense, it is something that we would like to
believe. By seeing woman-abuse as 'private,' we affirm it as a
problem that is individual, that only involves a particular
male-female relationship, and for which there is no social
responsibility to remedy.151
151. Schneider, supra note 117, at 983.
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Legal reforms of the last twenty years mark a shift in the char-
acterization of domestic violence from a private to a public prob-
lem. Yet, notions of privacy continue to affect sentencing deci-
sions.'52 The judicial system remains reluctant to break up the
family via criminalization. 55 As the Supreme Court of Ohio re-
cently ruled: "Certainly a court's resources in a domestic vio-
lence case are better used by encouraging a couple to receive
counseling and ultimately issuing a dismissal than by going for-
ward with a trial and impaneling a jury where the only witness
refuses to testify.""
Although criminalization serves to make public what was con-
sidered a private family matter, treatment seeks to reunite the
152. Even though domestic violence is a crime against the state, courts often defer
to the victim's wishes in sentencing decisions, at times to the detriment of the vic-
tim herself. The court will attempt to alleviate the concerns of the victim by creat-
ing lengthy periods of probation and requiring the batterer to attend treatment. See,
e.g., State v. Powell, 696 So. 2d 789, 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), affd, 703 So. 2d 444
(Fla. 1997).
153. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hatfield, 593 A.2d 1275, 1276-77 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991), affd, 610 A.2d 466 (Pa. 1992) (upholding the trial courts decision to quash a
subpoena issued for the wife to testify against her husband for assault on her, not-
ing that "the trial court found that the ends of justice would best be served by
granting the petition, apparently seeing the termination of the prosecution ... as a
means of preserving the Hatfields' marriage").
154. State v. Busch, 669 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (Ohio), reconsideration denied, 671
N.E.2d 1286 (Ohio 1996). The court held that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in dismissing a criminal case over the prosecution's objection in which the
victim, who had been thrown down stairs and burned with a cigarette by her boy-
friend, wished not to proceed. See id. The victim testified pretrial that she and the
defendant had three counseling sessions in the previous month and a half and there-
fore wished the charges to be dropped. See id. at 1126-27. The trial court stated:
I want the record to reflect that the prosecuting witness has been down
here a number of occasions now; she has appeared when she was subpoe-
naed to be here; and on a number of occasions, she has come in stating
that this is her desire. The prosecutor's office has made it very clear,
both to the court and to the prosecuting witness, their position on this
matter. However, these are two adults. These parties think they can
work their problems out. And this branch of the court doesn't think it
should stand in their way of doing that.
Id. at 1127.
The Supreme Court of Ohio partially based its decision on the assumption that
there was no evidence other than the victim's testimony. See id. at 1129. The re-
cord, however, contained photographs of the injuries, police reports, and testimony
that may have been sufficient to sustain a conviction. See id. at 1126-27.
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offender and the victim, thus privileging the sanctity of the fam-
ily over other policy objectives. Indeed, the emphasis on treat-
ment arguably has had the unintended consequence of reinforc-
ing the social hierarchy that allows, and encourages, men to gov-
ern their spouses, thus supporting male dominance over women.
Ordering someone with a pattern of violence against the same
victim to attend a program trivializes domestic violence. As
Natalie Loder Clark argues:
The cause of a violent argument often makes the whole inci-
dent seem trivial. For example, an argument over a burned
meal, use of the car, or a tape recorder does not sound terri-
bly serious to some people. The same method of trivialization,
however, could doubtless be applied to other battery cases as
well. The causes of barroom brawls often include such earth-
shaking items as dart games, football scores, and television
program choices. Clearly the original cause of an argument is
irrelevant to the degree and significance of the resulting vio-
lence; sometimes even murders result from causes such as
those listed above.155
One who abuses women needs help; one who abuses a stranger
is dangerous. Even if the barroom brawler does not pose so great
a threat that he is prosecuted and incarcerated, the difference
between these two situations is that the brawler does not have
continued access to his victim; the abuser does. If a barroom
brawler continued to strike out against the same patron over
and over, then it is hard to imagine a court ordering "barroom
brawler" treatment.156 Arguably, rehabilitation is not punish-
ment because the goal is to make the offender's life more mean-
ingful in the long run, not to deprive him of his liberty. " '
Treatment is a benefit-the offender is rewarded with services
155. Natalie Loder Clark, Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victims and
Perpetuating Violence, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 289 (1987).
156. If the barroom brawler has an alcohol or drug addiction, however, certainly
treatment is appropriate, although addiction does not excuse or cause criminal be-
havior in most cases. The same should hold true for abusers. Addiction treatment in
cases where substance abuse is an aggravating factor is warranted, but should not
be a substitute for punishment.
157. See Reed, supra note 6, at 363.
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that might not otherwise be available to him had he not broken
the law. This is particularly true when defendants pay relatively
little to attend these programs. 5 '
One of the most frustrating cases that I handled involved a
woman whose boyfriend beat her and then intentionally burned
her with a curling iron. Prosecutors dropped at least three other
cases because the woman was too scared to go forward and no
other evidence had been produced to sustain a conviction. In this
case, however, the police did an excellent job documenting the
battery, including photographing the burns. The defendant pled
guilty to battery. I recommended a six-month period of incarcer-
ation, which was still disproportionately low to the resulting
harm. The victim was too afraid to appear at the sentencing
hearing; she just wanted the defendant out of her life. The de-
fense attorney opposed the sentence recommendation, arguing
that the defendant should be allowed to enroll in a treatment
program in lieu of jail, otherwise he would lose his job. The
judge agreed with defense counsel.
A few weeks later the police found cocaine on the defendant
during a traffic stop. Because it was the defendant's second of-
fense for possession with intent to distribute, he received a one-
year sentence. Neither the judge nor the prosecutor mentioned
that he was currently on probation for a battery charge. It
struck me as unfair that the justice system would sentence these
two cases with such disparity. I blamed the judge in the battery
case for "not getting it."
Although critics of incarceration argue that it is a practical
impossibility to put every abuser in jail, the American public is
willing to support policies that result in incarceration. For exam-
ple, under federal and many state laws, drug offenders face se-
vere sentences for possession with intent to distribute illegal
drugs.'59 The prison population contains well over one million
occupants, compromised predominately of drug offenders. 6 '
The reasons for disparity in sentencing between offenses involv-
158. See supra note 118 (describing the fee structures of some programs).
159. The debate over the war on drugs is better left for another forum. See STEVEN
B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC
CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 178-80 (1993).
160. See id. at 179.
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ing violence against women and illegal substances are indeed
many, but we should not ignore the implicit value judgment
about which offenses constitute the greater social harm. In com-
parison to other crimes, preferring treatment to incarceration for
domestic violence looks like lingering sexism.
2. Deterrence
Other theories of punishment are less influenced by the down-
side of privacy'6' and better serve the public function of the
criminal law." 2 General deterrence-punishment for the sake
of prevention-can have a long-term instrumental effect in
changing public views of battering.
The decisions of the courts and actions by the police and pris-
on officials transmit knowledge about the law, underlining
the fact that criminal laws are not mere empty threats, and
providing detailed information as to what kind of penalty
might be expected for violations of specific laws. To the ex-
tent that these stimuli restrain citizens from socially unde-
sired actions which they might otherwise have committed, a
general preventive effect is secured.'63
161. Privacy is not necessarily a negative concept for women. Elizabeth Schneider
poignantly argues that privacy can have an affirmative meaning for women. See
Schneider, supra note 117, at 996-98 (arguing that privacy can derive from an affir-
mative concept of liberty rather than the right to be left alone); infra notes 179-81
and accompanying text (discussing the positive aspects of privacy).
I use the term "privacy" in a manner more similar to Catharine MacKinnon's
concept of privacy. The downside of privacy has justified the right of a man to beat
his wife without fear of criminal prosecution. See MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 100
("[Fleminism has had to explode the private ... . In this sense, [for women] there
is no private, either normatively or empirically."); see also Frances E. Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1497, 1506 (1983) (explaining the theory of the private family).
162. As William McDonald explains, "The criminal justice system is not for [the
crime victim's] benefit but for the community's. Its purposes are to deter crime, re-
habilitate criminals, punish criminals, and do justice, but not to restore victims to
their wholeness or to vindicate them." William F. McDonald, The Role of the Victim
in America, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL 295, 296 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel,
III eds., 1977).
163. Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 949, 949 (1966).
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The emphasis on treatment undermines the general deterrent
function of the law. Battering becomes analogous to illness; men
who beat women are "sick," rather than engaging in criminal
behavior of their own free will. This allows potential offenders to
distance themselves from other abusers by creating two classes of
men-sick and healthy. This false dichotomy subverts the educa-
tion of the citizenry about what constitutes acceptable behavior.
Specific deterrence theory-imposing a sentence on a defen-
dant that will prevent him from repeating the same behav-
ior-avoids the privacy trap by emphasizing the individual costs
of wrongdoing. It assumes ihat people are rational actors; they
choose to abuse and thus are less likely to engage in the behav-
ior again if the sentence is high enough. Opponents of specific
deterrence cite high recidivism rates for those punished. It is
just as likely, however, that the costs associated with beating
one's partner have been too low to motivate a change in behav-
ior."64 Again, Clark's insights are useful: "Criminal reme-
dies... 'tak[e] from the guilty the fruits of his offence.' Instead
of the abuser controlling the victim's person or life, the abuser's
life and person are instead subjected to control by the state." s
164. This individual cost-benefit analysis is complicated because some studies sug-
gest that specific deterrent effects of criminalization will be greater for batterers who
perceive higher social costs associated with acts of violence. See Lee H. Bowker,
Coping with Wife Abuse: Personal and Social Networks, in BATTERED WOMEN AND
THEIR FAMILIES, 168, 188 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 1984); Kirk R. Williams & Richard
Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A Critical Review, 20 L. & Soc.
REV. 545, 594-48 (1986). These social costs can include the loss of a job, relation-
ship, children, and social status. See Williams & Hawkins, supra, at 558; Kirk R.
Williams & Richard Hawkins, Controlling Male Aggression in Intimate Relationships,
23 L. & Soc. REV. 591, 593-600 (1989); Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, The
Meaning of Arrest for Wife Assault, 27 CRIMINoLOGY 163, 166 (1989); see also supra
note 130 (describing the correlation between recidivism and employment of the abus-
er in arrest experiments).
What this theory might suggest is that people with fewer economic and social
resources require harsher punishments to be deterred. Such a policy, however, would
likely disadvantage people whose economic situation already increases the likelihood
that they would resort to violence. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. This
could result in a cycle of poverty, punishment, and violence. Perhaps different pun-
ishments coupled with programs that help people become more vested in our com-
munities are necessary.
165. Clark, supra note 155, at 280 (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF
LEGISLATION 201 (N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd. ed., 1975) (1802)).
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When the final outcome in a criminal case is treatment, the of-
fender gains many benefits and suffers few consequences. In
fact, studies suggest that psychological abuse, including threats
of violence, increases during treatment.' Treatment facilitates
ongoing psychological abuse by allowing the abuser to stay with
his victim, thus imposing few negative sanctions.
3. Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Therapeutic jurisprudence, growing largely from a merger of
rehabilitation and specific deterrence theories, focuses on the
psychological and behavioral aspects of the offender to prevent
future criminal behavior.'67 The goal of punishment is to pro-
mote behavioral changes through an understanding of the psy-
chology of the offender. "The schema of therapeutic jurisprudence
suggests that the law can act as a therapeutic agent, whereby
legal rules, legal procedures, and the roles of legal actors (such as
police, lawyers, and judges) can constitute social forces that often
produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic results. " "
In a compelling article about therapeutic jurisprudence and
domestic violence, Leonore Simon argues:
Requiring prosecutors to recommend sentences commensurate
with other crimes could have therapeutic effects on offenders
and victims by communicating to them that a serious crime
has occurred, and that the perpetrator will be punished.
Judges also can confront offender denial and minimization
by sentencing these cases as they would other crimes, and by
recognizing that offenders will violate sentencing orders and
conditions with impunity if they believe that nothing will
happen to them.'69
166. See Myers, supra note 102, at 501; Tineke Ritmeester, Batterers' Programs,
Battered Women's Movement, and Issues of Accountability, in PENCE & PAYMAR, su-
pra note 92, at 169, 176-77.
167. For a general discussion of therapeutic jurisprudence and the relationships be-
tween legal arrangements and therapeutic outcomes, see ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JU-
RISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991); DAVID B. WEXLER,
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990).
168. Simon, supra note 6, at 50 (footnotes omitted).
169. Id. at 75 (citing STEPHEN B. HERRELL & MERIDITH HOFFORD, FAMILY VIO-
LENCE PROJECT, NATIONAL COUNCIL JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY VIo-
LENCE: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE 21 (1990)).
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From this perspective, lenient treatment is antitherapeutic for
both the offender and the victim. Therapeutic justice, however,
may have the unintended consequence of reinforcing the notion
that domestic violence is an aberrational illness rather than
part of a culture that generally condones violence. Further-
more, like many psychological theories, the science supporting
this rationale for punishment remains inconclusive. Neverthe-
less, therapeutic approaches to punishment, at least theoreti-
cally, do not necessarily militate against punishment that re-
sults in incarceration.
4. Incapacitation
Incapacitation theory provides that for the good of those who
abide by the law, offenders who violate social norms ought to be
prevented from reoffending in the future.7 ° Incapacitation has
grown in popularity with the public and lawmakers who are in-
creasingly anxious about stranger-danger in particular.'71 For
example, skepticism about treatment has led to statutes intend-
ed to remove sex offenders from society indefinitely. Recently, in
Kansas v. Hendricks'72 the Supreme Court held that states can
indefinitely incarcerate violent sexual predators who have com-
pleted their sentences in mental hospitals, even if they are not
actually mentally ill, if they are believed to be dangerous.'78
Statutes like the one at issue in Hendricks should protect inno-
cent victims from offenders who are arguably untreatable and
undeterable.
Long-term incapacitation certainly is warranted in many sex
offender cases,17 but Hendricks has potentially frightening
170. For a thorough study of incapacitation theory, see FRANKLIN E. ZaInPNG &
GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION (1995).
171. See Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, supra note 12, at 851.
172. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
173. See id. at 2079-81.
174. For example, Jesse Timmendequas, seven-year-old Megan Kanka's killer, was a
twice-convicted sex offender who served only six years in prison before he lured
Kanka into his house, raped her, and strangled her with a belt. See Dale Russakoff
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long-term implications. It gives psychiatrists a crystal ball to
gaze into the future and predict whether sex offenders will recid-
ivate. These powers of prediction can result in the permanent
deprivation of liberty for offenders who have already paid their
debt to society. The Supreme Court arguably has given psychia-
trists too much power to decide who among us ought to be re-
moved. Hendricks also could lead to the sort of individualization-
syndromization that excuses violent behavior, undermining indi-
vidual free will and responsibility. Whether such legislation
would be upheld if applied to other types of offenders is unclear.
A time could come, however, when courts classify some offenders
as "serial batterers."175 Hendricks indicates that indefinite in-
capacitation for batterers might be preferred and constitutional
policy. Advocates of aggressive criminalization of domestic vio-
lence are cautioned: We must be careful what we wish for. Tak-
en to its extreme, incapacitation theory signals that we have
given up hope entirely. Hendricks may lead us down a path of
TON CHRON., June 21, 1997, at 15, available in 1997 WL 6565864; Sex Offender In-
dicted in Megan Kanka's Slaying: Death Penalty will be Sought, RECORD, NORTHERN
N.J., Oct. 20, 1994, at 3A, available in 1994 WL 7784740. Sex offender legislation
today often is referred to as Megan's Law, after Megan Kanka See Russakoff &
Harden, supra, at 15. Timmendequas should have served a longer sentence and re-
ceived treatment before being released. This may have prevented Kanka's death. A
New Jersey jury recently convicted Timmendequas of Kanka's death, and he received
the death penalty. See id.
175. See David A. Ford et al., Future Directions for Criminal Justice Policy on Do-
mestic Violence, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 3, at
243, 249 (predicting that lawmakers will soon include the concept of "serial
batterers" in the definition of habitual battering to account for new victims of one
violent offender). According to the American Psychiatric Association, the criteria for
borderline personality disorders include recurring periods of dejection and apathy
interspersed with spells of anger, anxiety, or euphoria; wavering energy levels and
irregular sleep-wake cycles; repetitive self-destructive thoughts; a preoccupation with
securing affection and maintaining emotional support with intense reaction to sepa-
ration; and conflicting emotions towards others, notably love, rage, and guilt. See
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 301.83, at 650-54 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Dutton argues that
these criteria seem consistent with cyclically abusive men. See DUTTON WITH
GOLANT, supra note 18, at 144-45; see also infra notes 240-48 and accompanying text
(regarding cyclically abusive men). If Dutton's theory gains credibility, then the same
criteria for civil incarceration for sex offenders could be applied to domestic abusers
as well.
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despair that we never intended to travel.
5. Retribution
Finally, retribution theory argues that persons who choose to
do wrong deserve punishment.'76 Failure to impose punish-
ment undermines the idea that the offender is a moral agent
acting of his own free will. Critics of retribution theory argue
that it validates hatred and encourages vengeance. Neverthe-
less, Kant's notion of reciprocal obligation may have some useful
place in theories for domestic violence punishment. As Stephen
Reed suggests:
To maintain a free society, Kant explained, citizens have a
'reciprocal obligation' not to impinge upon the freedom of oth-
ers. Should a member of society interfere with another's free-
dom, punishment can be imposed to regain the 'equilibrium' of
the community that has been knocked out of balance by the
violator's conduct. Punishment consists of a 'counterbalancing
disadvantage' imposed upon the person attempting to gain an
unfair advantage on the other members of society."7
Kant's notion of reciprocal obligation has an instrumental as
well as retributive value when applied to gender inequality. It
promotes the notion that men should not be allowed to gain un-
fair advantages over women via intimate violence. Retribution
theory further adds an air of moral condemnation to domestic
violence-a sentiment that the advocacy community has sought
to promote. Its emphasis on accountability as opposed to self-
improvement is thus consistent with both feminist and conser-
vative rationales for the criminalization of domestic violence.
There are both benefits and drawbacks to any theory of pun-
176. For arguments about retribution theory, see Dan M. Kahan & Martha C.
Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 269
(1996); Samual H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on
Choice, Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719, 742-52 (1992); Benjamin B.
Sendor, The Relevance of Conduct and Character to Guilt and Punishment, 10 NOTRE
DAIMIE J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 99 (1996).
177. Reed, supra note 6, at 361 (footnotes omitted) (quoting ANDREW VON I CH,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PuNISHmENTs 47 (1986)).
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ishment one chooses to justify domestic violence sentencing deci-
sions. Clearly, however, justifying punishment solely on rehabili-
tation is far more costly than might first appear. Despite notions
to the contrary, when judges make sentencing decisions with the
sole purpose of rehabilitating the offender, they are often rein-
forcing the private nature of violence and putting women and
the community at great risk. Seemingly well-intentioned sen-
tences often have unintended consequences. Furthermore,
cininalizing domestic violence must serve both general and spe-
cific objectives; none of the traditional theories of punishment
discussed provides an adequate foundation for balancing those
often competing goals. Therefore, rather than search for a per-
fect justification of punishment in this context, we should be
pragmatic by distinguishing those men who are genuinely de-
serving and capable of rehabilitation from those who are not.
B. Feminist Approaches to Punishment
One might assume that incarceration, which ultimately re-
moves male control over women, would drive feminist punish-
ment agendas. But we ought to be careful not to stereotype
feminists as wanting all bad men behind bars. A complicated
dynamic keeps advocates for battered women from rejecting out-
right faith in treatment despite the lack of empirical evidence
that mandated counseling works. Feminist advocates have not
only accepted treatment but have embraced it. Despite feminist
criticism of low sentences in particular cases and calls for in-
creased probation supervision," the preference for treatment
over incarceration has largely gone unchallenged.
There are many reasons why feminists might prefer treatment
over more, arguably male, modes of punishment. The first is
largely pragmatic. The domestic violence advocacy community is
painfully aware of the reluctance of judges and prosecutors to
178. See Barbara Hart, Battered Women and the Criminal Justice System, in DO
ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 3, at 98, 110-13; cf GAIL
GOOLKASIAN, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A GUIDE
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES (1985) (indicating that critics of the judicial re-
sponse to battering focus on judges' leniency and failure to impose sanctions com-
mensurate with similar violent crimes involving strangers).
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take these cases seriously, let alone incarcerate offenders. Treat-
ment programs offer at least some state supervision over the
offender. Because most of these offenses are misdemeanors, the
length of any jail stay would be short; unless some treatment
option is available, the offender never learns the skills to change
his behavior. Treatment is not perfect, but something is better
than nothing.
Treatment also caters to the "upside" of privacy for women.
Many in the feminist community argue that autonomous aspects
of privacy can further women's equality and freedom. Privacy
need not be confined to its historical meaning-as a separate
domestic sphere where men are left alone to oppress wom-
en-but rather can refer to a preservation of autonomy over im-
portant life decisions.' 9 Because many women want their part-
ners to change their behavior but do not want to end the rela-
tionship with incarceration, treatment is entirely consistent with
the feminist notion that the law ought to protect "basic decisions
of one's life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contracep-
tion, and the education and upbringing of children."8 ° The
availability of treatment thus empowers women to shape their
intimate relationships.'
A feminist acceptance of treatment might also be explained in
part by what Carol Gilligan calls the "ethic of care."8 ' Through
research on psychological theory, Gilligan argues that women
resolve moral dilemmas differently from men." Boys resolve
conflict by employing a hierarchy of values; girls focus on pre-
179. See Laura W. Stein, Living with the Risk of Backfire: A Response to the Fem-
inist Critiques of Privacy and Equality, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1153, 1173 (1993); see also
Schneider, supra note 117, at 976-79 (arguing that privacy can also have an affir-
mative role for women).
180. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis
omitted).
181. See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the PubliclPrivate Distinction, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 37 (1992) (arguing that privacy should protect consensual associations when
consent and freedom are not illusory); see also Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 629-47 (1980) (arguing that the freedom to
create, maintain, and terminate intimate associations is a necessary component of
any meaningful privacy right).
182. CARoL GELLGAN, IN A DFEENT VoicE 164 (1982).
183. See id. at 24-63.
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serving relationships." Women see "a world comprised of rela-
tionships rather than of people standing alone, a world that
coheres through human connection rather than through systems
of rules."" Treatment, which resolves the problem of battering
by focusing on improving the relationships between men and
women, is entirely consistent with Gilligan's ethic of care. Wom-
en are rehabilitationists; men retributionists."8 '
It is just as plausible that a feminist endorsement of treat-
ment raises the issue of who controls the solution to domestic
violence.'87 If men are gender-motivated to use violence, then
one way to correct this imbalance is to re-educate them to view
women as equals. Treatment programs turn the tables of control
from misogynist men to profeminist women and men whose
agenda it is to restructure gender relations. This shifting of pow-
er from patriarchy to matriarchy, however, does not necessarily
equalize the power balance between men and women; it may
have the unintended consequence of reinforcing dominance and
control of one group over another-precisely the problem that we
are trying to solve by criminalizing domestic violence.
Feminist treatment programs are as political as they are ther-
apeutic. They have much vested in the idea that treatment can
restructure gender relations. 8' These programs are not with-
out merit. But just as some men find it difficult to give up con-
trol of women through violence, so too will feminist advocates
face challenges relinquishing control over offenders through
treatment.
184. See id.
185. Id. at 29.
186. Gilligan's theory is controversial within the feminist legal community; some
have argued that women do not speak in a different voice but that male supremacy
dictates this ethic of care when it works to support men. See Seymore, supra note 5,
at 1068-69. Catharine MacKinnon disputes Gilligan's assertions, stating that the
"ethic of care" is simply "what male supremacy has attributed to us for its own
use." Id. at 1069 (quoting MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 39).
187. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
188. As the Duluth program argues, treatment can "diminish the power of batterers
over their victims and ... explore with each abusive man the intent and source of
his violence and the possibilities for change through seeking a different kind of re-
lationship with women." PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 92, at 1.
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C. The Realities of Practice
No theory can be so nuanced as to capture the day-to-day re-
alities of criminal domestic violence practice.' Nor should it.
As Daniel Farber has argued, the hardest questions in life-the
ones that promote a more flourishing society, are those that are
answered more by experience than by theory.' This section
discusses several practical dilemmas that result from the over-
reliance on treatment, even by the most well-intentioned in the
criminal justice system. I attempt to merge theory and practice
in a way that is meaningful to those who struggle to do the right
thing, especially when the right thing is so hard to do.
1. Not Al1 Cases Are Created Equally
Prosecutors face growing pressure to go forward with as many
domestic violence cases as possible, regardless of the sufficiency
of the evidence or the seriousness of the offense, 191 particularly
in jurisdictions that have policies limiting prosecutorial discre-
tion. 92 At the same time, advocates argue that if the victim
189. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 2151, 2152 (1995) (arguing that when merging feminist concerns with
the criminal law, "theory is not up to the task").
190. See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L.
REv. 1331, 1347 (1988).
191. Many district attorney's offices have adopted pro-prosecution policies in domes-
tic violence cases. See Rebovich, supra note 3, at 189. Although these polices vary
greatly among jurisdictions, their purpose is to check prosecutorial discretion and
actively encourage prosecution. See Hanna, supra note 2, at 1860-63.
192. Numerous reasons explain why prosecutor discretion traditionally led to case
dismissal and why these cases historically have not been prosecuted. See Buzawa &
Buzawa, supra note 54, at xvii ("[Pirosecutors have consciously assumed that the
motivation and commitment of victims is a legitimate case discriminator in deciding
whether to prosecute an offender."); Janell Schmidt & Ellen Hochstedler Steury,
Prosecutorial Discretion in Filing Charges in Domestic Violence Cases, 27 CRIMINOLO-
GY 487, 500 (1989) ("Decisions short of formal charging were . . . made in cases in
which the burden of proof could conceivably be met, but the victim expressed a de-
sire for the prosecutor to be lenient."); Wangberg, supra note 3, at 8 ("High case
attrition rates in domestic violence actions can generally be classified under the gen-
eral rubric of 'victim reluctance."); see also Cahn & Lerman, supra note 51, at 96
(stating that, in the past, prosecutors failed to proceed in domestic violence cases
because they believed that the victim perpetrated the abuse or that battering was a
"minor dispute]" or a "private family matter"); Waits, supra note 53, at 299-302
(1985) (arguing that the legal system has used many rationales for nonintervention,
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will be "revictimized" or "disempowered" as a result of prosecu-
tion, the case should not be prosecuted. 9 3 The advocacy com-
munity keeps sending out mixed messages. On one hand, they
want the criminal justice system to take these cases seriously;
on the other, they are unwilling to acknowledge the practical
dilemmas posed when a jurisdiction pursues an aggressive strat-
egy. For example, in serious cases, the better decision might be
to proceed with a case against the victim's wishes and bear the
risks involved with that decision. For first-time, minor offenses
including family privacy, the perception that battering is a "Victimless crime," the
notion that "legal institutions are ill-equipped to deal with complex social and psy-
chological problems" like battering, and the erroneous stereotype that legal interven-
tion hurts women).
193. See Hart, supra note 178, at 106-10; Mills, supra note 2, at 191-92; see also
Bruce L. Benson, The Lost Victim and Other Failures of the Public Law Experiment,
9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 399, 399, 424-27 (1986) (arguing that crime victims
should have primary responsibility for prosecution of crimes and should receive com-
pensation for their injuries as in tort law); Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the
Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 357, 388-90 (1986) (noting that the
criminal justice system alienates the victim and can effectively preclude her from
receiving restitution); Kenneth L. Wainstein, Comment, Judicially Initiated Prosecu-
tion: A Means of Preventing Continuing Victimization in the Event of Prosecutorial
Inaction, 76 CAL. L. REV. 727, 731-32 (1988) (proposing the use of court-appointed
prosecutors to represent crime victims who do not receive the full protection of the
law); Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, § 6
(Magazine), at 22 (citing Susan Schechter, a well-known and well-respected advocate
and author, who contends that no-drop policies can "erode a battered woman's sense
of self-esteem and control"); Deborah P. Kelly, Have Victim Reforms Gone Too
Far-Or Not Far Enough?, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1991, at 22, 22-28, 38 (outlining recent
victim reform statutes and arguing that these reforms reflect a consensus that vic-
tims of crime should factor into the criminal justice system); Sarah Buel, Combating
Domestic Violence, Address at Vermont Law School (Mar. 21, 1997) (videotape on
file with author) (arguing that victim safety, not prosecution, should be the goal of
state intervention).
Personally, I have been troubled by the suggestion that cases should be
dropped if prosecution places the victim in more danger or "revictimizes" her emo-
tionally. First, there is no accurate way to predict whether the woman will be in
more or less danger if the case proceeds. Furthermore, those defendants who are
least deterred by criminal prosecution are precisely the ones that we most ought
to prosecute and incarcerate because they pose the greatest danger to women and
our communities.
Arguments that equate proceeding in a criminal case with a reluctant victim
and abuse and the possible risk of death trivialize the physical harm that women
experience. These arguments ultimately portray women as helpless victims who are
too emotionally unstable to recognize the public goals of the criminal system and
their role within it.
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where no serious injury results, the better decision might be to
dismiss that case in order to concentrate efforts on the more
serious ones.
Furthermore, prosecutors receive the mixed message that they
are both therapist and trial attorney;'94 in fact, one commen-
tator advocates that "prosecutors should commit to nurturing
the victim emotionally, with the overall goal of reducing domes-
tic violence."'95 Yet, supporting the victim emotionally and
holding the batterer criminally responsible are often conflicting
goals. 9 This dichotomy can frustrate prosecutors untrained
and unprepared for such a dual role.'97 In my experience train-
ing prosecutors, I find that many well-intentioned district attor-
neys end up resenting these cases, feeling as if they spend too
much time "hand-holding" and not enough time investigating
cases, preparing witnesses, and perfecting trial strategies that
can increase the likelihood of conviction.
Many jurisdictions handle a staggering number of cases,'
194. Some jurisdictions employ social workers or work closely with victim advocates
to ease this dilemma. See Cahn & Lerman, supra note 51, at 102-03. In Alexandria,
Virginia, for example, a victim can drop charges after appearing before a counselor
or a judge to explain her refusal. These programs have been criticized for mandating
that the victim appear in court before the case is dismissed, claiming that such pro-
grams punish the victim. See id. at 101. Nevertheless, even if an office has a social
worker, prosecutors often feel compelled to act as social worker when working with
victims.
195. Mills, supra note 2, at 195. The problem with Mills's analysis is that it fails
to recognize the realities of practice. It also pathologizes women. No matter how
"emotionally nurtured" women are by district attorneys, they cannot prevent their
partners from engaging in violence. It is the role of law enforcement, not individual
women who have been victimized, to ensure that dangerous offenders are held ac-
countable and that the most dangerous are incapacitated.
196. See Waits, supra note 53, at 307. There is a conflict between the public and
private goals in the response to domestic abuse, resulting in a difficult determination
for prosecutors. Although their formal client is the state, domestic violence prosecu-
tors often find themselves as advocates for abused women. This dual role results in
a crisis of conscience for the determined prosecutor, who often dismisses charges
against the batterer out of respect for the victim's wishes. See Asmus et al., supra
note 28, at 157 (noting that prosecutors "often experience[ the same intensity of
reaction and blame that victims experience, particularly when the victims themselves
fail to appreciate the efforts extended in their behalf').
197. See FAGAN, supra note 3, at 16-17.
198. For example, the San Diego police department has a special domestic violence
unit with a full-time staff of 20 detectives, three sergeants, and an additional sup-
port/volunteer staff of eight. See Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 51, at 297-98. The unit
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and most jurisdictions do not have the investigative resources to
distinguish and prioritize.'99 Defendants usually refuse to plea
bargain unless incarceration is off the table. En masse guilty
pleas with treatment recommendations, in lieu of jail, help expe-
dite overcrowded dockets."' Everyone ends up with treatment
even though offenses and offenders vary greatly.
Experience tells us that these cases are as much differences of
kind as differences of degree. Some cases are serious, evincing a
pattern of ongoing abuse, while others are isolated incidents,
often complicated by alcohol or drug use. For example, while
practicing, I often had cases where someone called the police to
report noisy neighbors. When the police arrived, both parties
were intoxicated and sometimes violent, but no injuries were
apparent. Often the male would be arrested under our preferred
arrest policy. Upon investigating those cases, it was simply un-
clear what happened. The woman would tell me that they were
both drinking and "things got out of hand" but denied that her
partner struck her. She would sometimes claim, "I started it and
he was just trying to calm me down." Many times there were no
prior arrests for any criminal violation for either the defendant
or the alleged victim. Although troubling, cases like these are
not as serious as others, and often the evidence supporting the
charge is minimal, at best. Nevertheless, with forty to one hun-
dred cases to screen a week, pressure not to drop, and fear about
investigates over 1200 cases a month. See id. The Domestic Violence Council estab-
lished the unit through grass roots efforts. See id. at 305-06. Some jurisdictions that
have appropriated monies for specialized units have had to scale back due to bud-
getary constraints. Caseloads in specialized units can be staggering. In Baltimore
City, for example, two attorneys and two paralegals handle over 7000 cases per
year. See Cahn, supra note 51, at 171; see also Salzman, supra note 56, at 362
(noting that lack of funding creates a "formidable barrier" to the Quincy program
and to domestic violence prosecution throughout Massachusetts); Philip J. LaVelle,
Budget's New Victim: Domestic Violence, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 30, 1992, at
Al, available in 1992 WL 4758652 (stating that as many as 2000 domestic violence
cases in San Diego would go unprosecuted due to budget cutbacks).
199. See Hanna, supra note 2, at 1901-06 (outlining evidence-gathering strategies to
differentiate between serious and minor incidents).
200. Long delays between arraignment and trial lessen the likelihood of conviction.
For a general discussion of the benefits of an accelerated docket for domestic vio-
lence cases, see Federic B. Rodgers, Develop an Accelerated Docket for Domestic Vio-
lence Cases, JUDGES' J., Summer 1992, at 2 (describing the Westminster, Colorado
municipal court accelerated, or "fast-track," domestic violence program).
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what would happen if my instinct was wrong, I often kept these
cases in the system longer than necessary, trying to get some
guilty plea with a condition of treatment-just in case.
Ironically, the most serious cases often end with probation
and counseling, if not outright dismissal, because taking a case
from conviction to incarceration poses many risks, even in juris-
dictions willing to mandate the victim's participation.2"' High-
risk defendants control their victims; they are most unpre-
dictable and frightening. It is therefore difficult for prosecutors
to gain the victim's cooperation and keep her safe during the
prosecution process.
One of the worst cases I handled involved a woman who had
been beaten severely by her boyfriend. He once hit her with a
belt and strangled her with pantyhose ripped from her legs. She
always failed to appear for court despite supportive efforts from
my staff and a criminal subpoena. On the day scheduled for
trial, I sent a police officer to her home to remind her to attend
court, something I did only if the victim had a history of nonap-
pearance. When the officer arrived at her home, he found her
handcuffed to the bed, allegedly by the defendant.
The woman was willing to cooperate with the criminal case,
but she threatened to disappear unless I recommended proba-
tion and counseling. She feared her boyfriend would retaliate if
sentenced to jail. There was not enough evidence to proceed
without the victim's cooperation, 22 and I did not have the time
or the resources to devote the attention this case deserved.0 ' I
choked on my words as I told the judge that I would be willing
201. See Hanna, supra note 2, at 1865-68, 1885-94.
202. Model jurisdictions such as San Diego, California and Quincy, Massachusetts
focus on evidence gathering, and thus prosecutors are able to go forward in many
cases without the victim's testimony. See Gwinn, supra note 3, at 19; Salzman, su-
pra note 56, at 345; see also Hanna, supra note 2, at 1901-09 (describing evidence-
gathering techniques that assist the prosecution in meeting its burden of proof with-
out relying solely on the victim's testimony). These programs are still in their infan-
cy; most prosecutors still rely solely on victim testimony to proceed. See Rebovich,
supra note 3, at 189-90 (recommending that prosecutors devote increased efforts to
explore the full range of methods that can be applied to successfully solicit the par-
ticipation of the victim in the criminal justice process).
203. My caseload averaged from 40 to 100 cases a week. This load is not unusual
in many urban jurisdictions. See supra note 198.
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to accept probation with attendance in treatment. The victim
disappeared soon after the guilty plea. I could not confirm if the
defendant ever attended a treatment program, not that it would
have done him any good.
This story illustrates the frustration that results when there
is too much pressure to proceed in every case, too few resources
to document the serious ones, and little time to do the job right.
Court-mandated treatment programs allow everyone to save
face. The prosecutor checks-off "conviction" on his stat sheet; the
defense attorney feels like she did some good for her client; the
victim has a sense of hope, however false, that the criminal jus-
tice system will help her partner change his ways; the offender
avoids jail; the judge is not accused of taking these cases too
lightly; the treatment program gets yet another client to support
its existence; and we all go home happy.., until the next time.
2. Autonomy and the Rubric of Empowerment
Court-mandated treatment not only facilitates the "adminis-
tration of justice" in these cases, but it also promotes notions of
victim empowerment and decision making. Whether autonomy
and the right to make one's own decisions offer more liberation
for women," or are false notions masking subordination, °5
continues to be debated in feminist legal scholarship. In prac-
tice, most victims want the violence in their relationships to stop
and to that extent will cooperate with the state. Many women,
however, will resist outcomes that involve criminal records, jail,
fines, or other punitive measures. When a woman wants her
partner to receive treatment despite a serious offense or his
204. See Schneider, supra note 117, at 996-98; Stein, supra note 179, at 1173. Jus-
tice Douglas argued that privacy should protect "basic decisions of one's life," Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted), but
that this privacy derives more from an affirmative concept of liberty rather than
from the (arguably masculine) right to be left alone. See Schneider, supra note 117,
at 996.
205. See generally Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987)
(criticizing the conception of the female in liberal legal feminism and in radical femi-
nist legal criticism and noting that both groups fail to address the distinctive quality
of women's subjective, hedonic lives).
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long-term dangerousness, the prosecutor and judge must navi-
gate the tricky waters between a victim's personal autonomy
and concerns for public safety and justice.
This dilemma is particularly painful in cases where incarcera-
tion could result in financial hardship."' In Baltimore City, for
example, one of the best defenses to incarceration was employ-
ment, or what was often facetiously referred to as "punch and
pay." Despite improved social services intended to help abused
women through difficult times,0 7 courts often face the difficult
decision of whether to incarcerate a dangerous offender and risk
the family's loss of income or to permit the defendant to attend
treatment and risk future violence. This dynamic is complicated
further when judges fear that the stress of unemployment might
exacerbate the violence upon the offender's release.
Furthermore, strong emotional ties exist between women and
their abusers. Women often feel responsible for breaking this
bond; the experience of separation can be traumatic. 28 Defen-
dants may pressure victims to drop charges or to request coun-
seling so the couple can reunite. No evidence suggests that
harsher sanctions place victims at greater risk of new vio-
lence,.0 9 but in individual cases, the defendant may escalate vio-
206. Arguably, the victim faces an economic life at or below poverty level upon
leaving the relationship. See RUTH SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE PLIGHT
OF POOR WOMEN IN AFFLUENT AMERICA (1986); see also David A. Ford, Prosecution
as a Victim Power Resource: A Note on Empowering Women in Violent Conjugal
Relationships, 25 L. & SOCY REV. 313, 319 (1991) (noting that women may be more
concerned with surviving economically than with using legal institutions to guarantee
their own safety); Hart, supra note 178, at 103 (noting that some victims fear prose-
cution will wreak economic havoc on the family).
207. For a description of social services available to violence victims, see Develop-
ments, supra note 3, at 1506-09.
208. See Donald G. Dutton & James J. Browning, Concern for Power, Fear of Inti-
macy, and Aversive Stimuli for Wife Assault, in FAMILY ABUSE AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH 163, 168 (Gerald T. Hotaling et al. eds.,
1988).
209. See David A. Ford, Preventing and Provoking Wife Battery through Criminal Sanc-
tioning: A Look at the Risks, in ABUSED & BATTERED, supra note 56, at 207-08. Criminal
justice processing is likely to anger defendants, and some experiences may be more an-
gering than others. See id. at 208. Overall, though, victims are not at greater risk for
new violence because of criminal prosecution. See id. at 207-08. It is always difficult to
predict whether violence that happens after a criminal case is initiated results from that
initiation or if the abuse would have occurred regardless of the prosecution.
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lence to coerce his partner into reconciliation.1 °
Finally, there is a deep ambivalence as to whether children
who live in violent homes are better served by sending the abus-
er to treatment or to jail. Children who grow up in violent
homes are more likely to be abused themselves and abuse as
adults."' At the same time, parent absenteeism correlates to a
child's future involvement in the criminal justice system.212
Court-mandated treatment offers at least some compromise as to
what might be in the best interest of children.
D. The Paradox of Hope
"Evil" motivations alone cannot account for bad sentencing
decisions. All of us who work in this field experience the paradox
of hope-the optimistic but unrealistic belief that abusers can
unlearn their violence through treatment. This might be true in
individual cases, but it does not hold true universally. The chal-
lenge, then, is to develop a better understanding of when to
maintain hope and when to abandon it.
Ironically, the most often asked question in these cases is why
the woman does not leave.1 ' Women "stay" for many reasons:
financial dependence;1 4 fear of separation assaults;21 con-
cern for the children; low self-esteem; a perception that there is
no place to go; and hope. Many women believe that the violence
210. See Hart, supra note 178, at 106-07.
211. See Scott Harshbarger et al., Report on Domestic Violence: A Commitment to
Action, 28 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 313, 334 (1993) (citing research suggesting that "30
percent of abused children grow up to be abusive parents"); Salzman, supra note 56,
at 331 (arguing that "children who witness family violence will perpetuate the abuse
as adults"); Waits, supra note 53, at 297-98 (finding that children who view their
fathers abusing their mothers are more likely to become involved in abusive relation-
ships themselves, either as victims or batterers); Arthur L. Burnett Sr., Dispensing
Justice in Domestic Violence Cases: Pretrial Release and Sentencing of Offenders,
CRIM. JUST., Winter 1995, at 8, 57 (finding that "[albuse of a parent is detrimental
to children whether or not they are physically abused themselves").
212. See Travis Hirschi, The Family, in CRME 121, 136 (James Q. Wilson & Joan
Petersilia eds., 1995).
213. See Mahoney, supra note 146, at 61-68 (arguing that women can try to leave
many times before freeing themselves from a violent relationship).
214. See Frankel, supra note 47, at 60; Waits, supra note 53, at 276, 282;
Wangberg, supra note 3, at 10.
215. See Mahoney, supra note 146, at 61-63.
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will stop and the relationship will improve if only... (fill in the
blank). The wish list can include: he gets a job; he stops drink-
ing; I keep the kids from crying; I pay more attention to him; I
clean the house; or I love him more. Occasionally, women stay
until it is too late. This hope masks a deeper sense of
powerlessness. Nothing a woman does can stop the violence
unless her partner wants and is able to change. In my own work
with abused women, I find these conversations painful as I have
come to appreciate that it is the visionary part of people, not the
blind part, that believes personal transformation is possible.
This same sense of hope among criminal justice personnel is
partially what motivates the preference for treatment. Faith in
treatment reflects as much our naive idealism about the power
of change as it does our deeply ingrained reluctance to
criminalize violence against women. Legal decision making in
this context is not so different from personal decision making by
women to remain with abusive men. Recognizing the "good" as
well as "evil" motivations that drive sentencing decisions should
temper our arrogance about who "gets it" and who doesn't.
III. UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES AND DEVISING SOLUTIONS
This section asks "who are these guys" and argues that the
tendency to refer to a "profile of a batterer" is both inaccurate
and misleading. The section then discusses emerging research
on men who are violent and argues that although we are not
there yet, we are on our way to understanding what kind of
punishment might work best with which type of offenders and
when incarceration should be the only alternative. This section
concludes with practical recommendations for the criminal jus-
tice system.
A. The Dangers of Essentialism in Domestic Violence Work
In recent years, scholars and advocates have challenged the
idea that there is a "profile of a battered woman."21 Attacks
have come from two fronts. First, many have been critical of the
trend to pathologize abused women-to explain the dynamics of
216. See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1994).
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abuse in terms of complex psychological traits of individual
women."' Rather, many have argued that the emphasis on
psychology fails to capture social forces that lead to violence
against women."' It also has the unintended consequence of
promoting the notion that abused women are irrational.219
Second, many have challenged the "profile of a battered wom-
an" as reflecting only white, middle-class battered women."
Early feminist legal theory in particular had this tendency to
essentialize women's experiences."' Seldom did this work ex-
plore how race, class, or religion might affect women's experi-
ence with violence. Consequently, work on woman abuse has
become much more sophisticated. There is a growing under-
standing that for each woman, the battering experience is both
unique and common; women are affected by violence as much by
217. See id. at 7 (arguing that the defense of battered women who kill their abus-
ers often "defines the woman as a collection of mental symptoms, motivational defi-
cits, and behavioral abnormalities"); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial
for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623,
646 (1980) (voicing concern that expert testimony on learned helplessness may pro-
mote stereotypes of women).
218. See Coughlin, supra note 216, at 7; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminism and the
False Dichotomy of Victimization and Agency, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 387, 395-97
(1993); Schneider, supra note 7, at 527.
219. See generally Coughlin, supra note 216 (describing the failures, despite initial
feminist support, of the battered woman syndrome defense).
220. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF ExCLU-
SION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT ix (1988) (arguing that the generic "woman" notion "ob-
scures the heterogeneity of women and cute off examination of the significance of
such heterogeneity for feminist theory and political activity"); Angela P. Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 601 (1990)
(arguing that the criminal justice system historically has ignored violence against
black women and perpetrated violence against black men); Nilda Rimonte, A Ques-
tion of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against Women in the Pacific-Asian
Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1319-20 (1991) (find-
ing that Asian American women are less likely to involve the criminal justice sys-
tem in instances of battering for fear of bringing shame to the family and the
community); Schneider, supra note 7, at 532 (noting that although the popular
misconception is that most battered women are poor, women of color, or both, the
experience and understanding of white women largely has shaped work on batter-
ing); Beth Richie, Battered Black Women: A Challenge for the Black Community,
BLACK SCHOLAR, MarIApr. 1985, at 40, 43 (finding that African Americans have a
difficult time turning to the criminal justice system as a "vehicle for protection and
problem resolution").
221. See Minow, supra note 15, at 47; Schneider, supra note 7, at 531.
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internal factors, such as low self-esteem and abusive child-
hoods,2" as by external factors, such as class and ethnicity."
Ironically, legal academics, including myself, are guilty of
writing about "batterers" as if they constitute a single, homoge-
neous group. For example, a recent article by Malinda Seymore
argues: "The typical batterer is a traditionalist, believing in
male supremacy, the stereotyped masculine sex role in the fami-
ly, and his entitlement to use violence to discipline his wife. His
assumption that male entitlement has priority over female needs
allows him to deny the wrongness of the violence."' This ten-
dency to essentialize men who abuse as gender-motivated ob-
scures a far more complex phenomenon.
What these men do have in common is their criminal behav-
ior; they assault and batter their intimate partners without legal
justification. No evidence yet supports the proposition that there
is a "profile of a batterer." Just as women's experiences of vio-
lence are influenced by both internal and external factors, so too
is men's behavior influenced by a number of variables that make
batterers as different as they are alike." These differences
222. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BAT=ERED WOMAN SYNDROME 14-22 (1984) (de-
scribing the "psychosocial characteristics" of the interested parties).
223. See Harris, supra note 220, at 601; Rimonte, supra note 220, at 1319-20;
Richie, supra note 220, at 40; see also Beverly Horsburgh, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy:
Domestic Violence in the Jewish Community, 18 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 171 (1995)
(describing the particular difficulty Orthodox Jewish women face in dealing with
abusive relationships).
224. Seymore, supra note 5, at 1039 (footnotes omitted).
225. Research on batterer typologies and characteristics also has methodological
shortcomings. Like research on batterer treatment programs, we ought to be aware
of these shortcomings to better assess the usefulness of the data presented. First,
one important limitation of subtypes of batterers is that they have included only
men who actually enter treatment programs or battered women in shelters. See Amy
Holtzworth-Munroe & Gregory L. Stuart, Typologies of Male Batterers: Three Sub-
types and the Differences Among Them, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 476, 493 (1994). Because
many men have not been identified publicly as violent, samples may not be as rep-
resentative of the community at large.
Second, researchers generally have not compared their subtypes of violent men
with nonviolent men. Such comparisons are essential to understand how violent and
nonviolent men differ. See id. at 493-94.
Third, sample sizes tend to be small in these studies. The sampling of larger
populations is necessary to assure a more diverse cross-section of men-batterers
and nonbatterers, treated and nontreated. See Gondolf, supra note 145, at 199.
Fourth, reliance on imprecise, self-report descriptors of violence needs to be re-
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partially account for the failure of treatment to deter violence in
many cases.
B. Unessentializing Men Who Batter
This section reviews research on batterer typologies, psycho-
logical factors,26 biomedical factors, and environmental factors
that correlate to family violence. This research can better inform
domestic violence policy, though a note of caution is warranted.
None of this research suggests that men who abuse suffer from
placed by verified behavioral measures. Currently, researchers use different measure-
ments that are not necessarily consistent with each other. See id.
Fifth, just as in the research on batterer treatment programs, although women's
identification of violence may be more accessible and reliable than the batterers,
women are likely to underreport in areas of general violence, criminality, and social
history. The woman may not be fully aware of the batterer's behavior outside the
relationship. See id.
Sixth, there is still no conceptual agreement on what constitutes abuse. 'The
focus on battering as physical abuse and other forms of violence and antisocial be-
havior may in fact obscure 'nonphysical' terror experienced by the women, regardless
of type of batterer." Id. We also ought be cautious that these typologies do not fuel
the notion that women are better off with one type of batterer over another. See id.
226. Some researchers have identified psychological correlates of aggression. For
example, researchers generally view attachment to other individuals, including de-
pendency on others and empathy for others, as resulting from childhood experiences
with care givers. See Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 225, at 488. These
experiences can lead to insecure relationships. See id Some hypothesize that men
who are attached to, and preoccupied with, their wives are at risk to engage in
marital violence when threatened with the loss of their relationships. See id. Many
researchers have focus on attachment issues as a correlate to abusive behavior. See
id.; see also DONALD G. DUTITON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN 121-60 (1995)
(describing research on the abusive personality).
Some suggest that the ability to empathize with others correlates with the use
of violence. See Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 225, at 488. Researchers
assume that the more empathy a man feels for others, the more likely he is to en-
gage in family-only aggression. See id.
Another psychological variable often studied is impulsivity. Some researchers
suggest that this "is presumably an inherited, biologically based personality dimen-
sion related to temperament, physiological reactivity, and neurologically based behav-
ioral control systems." Id. Some personality theorists have related impulsivity to ag-
gressiveness and psychopathy or antisocial personality disorder. See id.
Finally, many have made distinctions between overcontrolled and
undercontrolled batterers. See DUTTON WITH GOLANT, supra note 18, at 29.
Overcontrolled batterers are 'control freaks" who extend their need to dominate oth-
ers, although undercontrolled batterers have difficulty checking their aggression and
thus act out impulsively. See id.
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a syndrome or other illness that undermines their free will.
Rather, most, although not all, violence appears to be strategic;
it is used in varying degrees and with different motivations to
gain some advantage or control over a mate. Research on men
who abuse is only useful to the law in that it helps us under-
stand what motivates male behavior so that we can devise bet-
ter sentencing alternatives. Current research does not provide
an escape route for abusive men to avoid criminal responsibility.
1. Batterer Typologies
Some of the most promising domestic violence research at-
tempts to differentiate among batterers. Different "types" of
batterers emerge from a synthesis of this research. Amy
Holtzworth-Munroe and Gregory Stuart recently reviewed nine-
teen studies on typologies and identified three subtypes of abu-
sive men: family-only batterers; borderline batterers; and gener-
ally violent/antisocial batterers. 27 I rely primary on the catego-
ries hypothesized by Holtzworth-Monroe and Stuart, but also
integrate the research of Edward Gondolf, Donald Dutton, and
others. Emerging typologies among different researchers are
surprisingly similar: differences lie more in terminology than in
concept." Family-only batterers constitute approximately fifty
227. See Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 225, at 476. These subtypes are
consistent with other subtypes developed in the literature. See, e.g., Gondolf, supra
note 145, at 196-97 (identifying sociopathic, antisocial and typical batterers); Stephen
D. Hart et al., The Prevalence of Personality Disorder Among Wife Assaulters, 7 J.
PERSONALITY DISORDERS 329, 330 (1993) (identifying antisocial psychopathic batterers
who display high levels of anger and jealousy and have criminal records that include
crimes in addition to domestic violence; sociopathic batterers who are frequently and
severely violent both inside and outside the home, suffered abuse as children, and
have lengthy criminal records; and men who are violent solely or primarily in their
relationships with women); Daniel G. Saunders, A Typology of Men Who Batter, 62
Ai. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 264, 273-74 (1992) (identifying family-only, generalized, and
emotionally volatile aggressors).
228. In a recent piece, Myrna Raeder proposes that prosecutors be permitted to
introduce domestic violence, social science framework evidence that is not syndrome-
or profile-oriented in order to level the playing field and provide a background
against which domestic violence evidence can be understood at trial. See Myrna S.
Raeder, The Better Way: The Role of the Batterers' Profile and Expert "Social Frame-
work" Background in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 147
(1997). Professor Raeder argues that "we need to study batterers to best understand
what makes them tick, how to control or cure their violent tendencies, and how to
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percent of all batterer samples." 9 These men tend to engage in
the least severe marital violence, psychological and sexual
abuse." Family-only batterers are less impulsive, less likely to
use weapons, and more likely to be apologetic after abusive inci-
dents.31 These men may be the most deterred by the threat of
criminal sanctions and the most treatable because of their abili-
ty to function normally outside of their relationships.
Borderline batterers constitute approximately twenty-five per-
cent of batterer samples.21 2 These men tend to "engage in mod-
erate to severe abuse, including psychological and sexual
abuse."213  Their violence generally is confined to the family,
but not always. They may evince borderline personality charac-
teristics and may have problems associated with drugs and alco-
hol. Batterer treatment, as it is currently structured, is likely to
be insufficient to change their behavior because many men in
this group may need more intensive treatment.2
Generally violent or antisocial batterers engage in moderate
to severe violence, including psychological and sexual abuse. Ed-
ensure that they receive the appropriate punishments for their crimes." Id. at 151. I
could not agree more with her conclusion. However, Professor Raeder bases her
analysis on Dr. Donald Dutton's work concerning abusive personalities. See id. at
155-78. Dr. Dutton's work offers valuable insights, but I am hesitant to suggest that
his analysis is the only useful one that exists. The feminist community must be
careful not to rely selectively on social science when it is consistent with a particu-
lar political agenda, ignoring data that is contrary to a particular position. For ex-
ample, many feminists were quick to jump on the battered woman's syndrome band-
wagon when the science supporting it was questionable, at best. See David L.
Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 75-76 (1997) (reviewing the scientific data on the battered women's
syndrome and concluding that it was never a matter of good science). In fact, such
reliance on bad science can have unintended consequences. See Coughlin, supra note
216; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195
(1986). I have attempted to take a broader view of the research on batterer
typologies that may not necessarily be consistent with any particular political agen-
da.
229. See Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 225, at 481-82.
230. See id. at 484-86.
231. See Gondolf, supra note 145, at 197.
232. See Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 225, at 482.
233. Id.
234. See id.
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ward Gondolf terms these batterers sociopathic."5 It is esti-
mated that this group constitutes twenty-five percent of batterer
samples." Uniformly, studies have found that generally vio-
lent men engage in more severe family violence than family-only
men." This finding challenges the myth that abusers are only
violent against family members. Generally violent batterers of-
ten have extensive criminal histories, including property, drug
or alcohol offenses, and violence crimes against nonfamily vic-
tins. These men are the most impulsive, the most likely to
use weapons, and feel the least amount of empathy towards
their victims. 9 Batterer treatment programs for this group
are inappropriate given the high degree of danger they pose.
Arguably, sociopathic batterers may be untreatable, and, in
many cases, ought to be incarcerated if only to protect their po-
tential victims.
All abusive men are not equally dangerous. Some men are
frequent and severe batterers; others are not.240 Dr. Donald
Dutton, a psychology professor at the University of British Co-
lumbia and director of the Assaultive Husband's Program in
Vancouver, focuses his research on personality traits of abusive
men. He distinguishes "cyclical" batterers from men who may
occasionally be aggressive in their relationships, "like the dis-
tinction between a single fender bender and continual head-on
collisions.""M Cyclical batterers constitute a subgroup of men
who are violent only in their intimate relationships. 2 They
235. See Gondolf, supra note 145, at 196-97.
236. See Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 225, at 482.
237. See id at 484-86 (reviewing current research on batterer typology and con-
cluding that studies uniformly find that generally violent men engage in more severe
violence).
238. See Gondolf, supra note 145, at 197; Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note
225, at 482, 484-86.
239. See Gondolf, supra note 145, at 196-97; Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra
note 225, at 484-86.
240. See, e.g., DUTrON Wr GOLANT, supra note 18, at 22-38; Michael Hershorn &
Alan Rosenbaum, Over- vs. Undercontrolled Hostility: Application of the Construct to
the Classification of Maritally V-olent Men, 6 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 151, 155-56
(1991).
241. DUTrON WITH GOLANT, supra note 18, at 22-23.
242. See DUTrON, supra note 226, at 125-27; DUTTON WITH GOLANT, supra note 18,
at 39-57.
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are repeat offenders who injure their partners, both psychologi-
cally and physically, until courts intervene, but appear "normal"
to the outside world because they direct their violence primarily
at their mates.2" Dutton theorizes that these characteristics
are a product of being abandoned by a loved one earlier in
life.' These men attribute their negative feelings to real or
perceived misdeeds by their partners and retaliate.245 Violence
diminishes anxiety about attachment by maintaining control
over a partner.2"
Dutton's distinction between men who are chronically abusive
and those who are not has important implications for prosecuto-
rial and sentencing decisions. "If once in his marriage a man
happens to push his wife in reaction to situational stresses, he
would still be considered abusive.... But, psychologically, that
is a very different type of individual than one who repeatedly
abuses or beats up his wife or engages in more serious as-
saults."2" According to Dutton, only two percent of the total
male population are "repeatedly severely assaultive" to women
in any given year.2" Thus, the criminal justice system ought to
be cautious before treating every man who engages in intimate
violence as a high-risk offender. In fact, Dutton's research sug-
gests that we may be able to identify and focus limited resources
on the chronically abusive, similar to other crime control strate-
gies that target career criminals rather than petty offenders.
243. See DUTTON WITH GOLANT, supra note 18, at 41-42.
244. See DUTTON, supra note 226, at 159-60.
245. See DUTrON WITH GOLANT, supra, note 18, at 41-57.
246. See DUTTON, supra note 226, at 154-57. Dutton further hypothesizes that Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), the general diagnostic category describing bat-
tered women's syndrome, is a "possible" feature of abusiveness because his research
revealed that many cyclically abusive men exhibited symptoms that resembled those
of PTSD. See DUTTON WITH GOLANT, supra note 18, at 74-77. The DSM-IV describes
PTSD as "the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an ex-
treme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that in-
volves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or threat to one's physical integ-
rity." DSM-IV, supra note 175, at 424. Symptoms, which can last for more than one
month and disturb normal functioning, include difficulty sleeping, irritability, out-
bursts of anger, difficulty concentrating, and exaggerated responses. See id. at 428.
247. Id. at 22.
248. DUTTON, supra note 226, at 10 (hypothesizing that 1,550,000 men in America
"present the core problem for the criminal justice system").
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2. Biomedical Factors
Some researchers have suggested that some violent behavior
may correlate to biomedical conditions. 9 For example, one
study found that men with previous head injuries were six times
as likely to display marital aggression as other men."0 This re-
search is consistent with findings that there may be a link be-
tween head trauma and violent behavior. 1
Other research has linked aggressive, dominant and antisocial
behavior to high testosterone levels and impulsive aggression to
low serotonin levels."s2 To date, however, whether testosterone
and/or serotonin are potential correlates of family violence re-
mains unclear.
Sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists might also add
to our understanding of violent behavior by men against wom-
en, although the application of evolutionary theories is still too
new for any valid conclusions to be drawn. From a biologist's
perspective, men have an inherited tendency to secrete adrena-
lin when they believe themselves to be sexually threatened by
other males.Y The label applied to this arousal, however,
will be socially determined.' Thus, male aggression against
females is part of male reproductive strategies geared toward
reproducing offspring and ensuring paternity; this sexual
agression is well-documented throughout the primate world and
cross-culturally.S
Biomedical factors alone cannot account for all abusive behav-
249. See, e.g., Alan Rosenbaum et al., Head Injury in Partner-Abusive Men, 62 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1187, 1991 (1994).
250. See id.
251. See, e.g., Patricia A. Brennan et al., Biomedical Factors in Crime, in CRIME,
supra note 212, at 65, 78-82.
252. See Amy Holtzworth-Munroe et al., An Overview of Research on Couple Vio-
lence: What Do We Know About Male Batterers, Their Partners, and Their Children?,
2 IN SESSION: PSYCHOTHERAPY IN PRACTICE 7, 10 (1996); see also Brennan et al.,
supra note 251, at 82-83 (summarizing findings on the relationship between neuro-
chemistry and aggression).
253. See DUTrON, supra note 226, at 30-33.
254. See id. at 32.
255. See Hanna, supra note 20 (applying evolutionary and biological research to
domestic violence and arguing that evolutionary insights can help devise better crim-
inal justice strategies); Smuts, supra note 20 (examining male violence against wom-
en from an evolutionary psychology perspective).
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ior.256 At best, a more complex interaction of social and neuro-
logical factors trigger violence in some.257 Nor is there any evi-
dence suggesting that biological factors should be a legal excuse
to violent behavior.25 Nevertheless, the emerging research on
biology and human behavior may provide valuable future in-
sights. Additionally, screening abusers for medical as well as
psychological factors might be prudent. Some men might benefit
from medical as well as psychological interventions, especially in
cases involving substance addictions or patterns of antisocial
behavior. At the very least, this research suggests that we need
to take a broader view of what "treatment" or other interven-
tions might entail apart from the current feminist-based group
therapy models currently in vogue.
3. External Factors
Although domestic violence occurs across all socioeconomic,
ethnic, and age groups, some groups may be at higher risk of
256. See Brennan et al., supra note 251, at 79.
257. Margo Wilson and Martin Daly have done extensive work in this field. See
MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE (1988). In this book, the authors argue
that intimate homicides follow a pattern that cannot be understood without the aid
of a sociobiology perspective. See id. at 1-15. They argue that males are far more
likely than females to experience extreme sexual jealousy because males have no
guarantee of paternity. See id. at 137-40. Hence, jealousy as a motive for homicide
should be more-frequent with male perpetrators.
For more explanation about evolutionary psychology and gender issues, see SEX,
POWER, CONFLIcT EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 20. See
also Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application
to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117 (1997) (arguing that the evolutionary perspec-
tive can usefully supplement, not supplant, prevailing notions of behavior concerning
child abusers). Jones's article also provides an excellent bibliography about the links
between biology, human behavior, and the law.
258. See generally Deborah W. Denno, Considering Lead Poisoning as a Criminal
Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 377 (1993) (suggesting that the criminal law be
more flexible in considering both the internal and external factors in determining an
individual's eligibility for a criminal defense, but finding unclear whether some envi-
ronmental factors such as lead poisoning produce internal disorders, such as
neurodevelopmental delay or hyperactivity, that might lead to violent behavior);
Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free
Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1988) (exploring the tension between individual free-
dom and social protection or responsibility in assessing culpability based on biologi-
cal defenses).
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violence. 9 For example, children exposed to violence are more
likely to become violent or to be victims of violence. ° Couples
in their twenties and thirties and those who cohabitate experi-
ence more violence than those who are older and married.261
The most severely abusive men are not composed of mere low-
income or minority cases,262 as some batterer stereotypes
might suggest.263 Empirical evidence, however, points to a con-
nection between domestic violence and low family income.
Other studies have found that abused women are more likely to
live in communities with the highest rates of stranger vio-
lence, 26 suggesting a link between domestic violence, general
violence, and neighborhoods with fewer economic and social
resources.
Multiple interpretations can be made from these findings.
First, people in lower socioeconomic groups are more likely to
259. See, e.g., Edleson & Syers, supra note 97, at 15.
260. Numerous studies have documented the correlation between growing up in an
abusive household and engaging in future violence. See Alfred DeMaris & Jann K.
Jackson, Batterers' Reports of Recidivism After Counseling, 68 SOC. CASEWORK 458,
463 (1987); supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text. Several have found that chil-
dren who witness abuse between their parents are likely to continue the pattern
themselves as adults because they believe that violence is the solution to most prob-
lems. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text. Most of these studies are pre-
mised on the notion that children model the behaviors of their parents and learn
their attitudes. Some have suggested an alternative explanation for the correlation
between childhood exposure to violence and adult battering. For example, Amy
Holtzworth-Munroe and others hypothesize that parental violence may disrupt
children's attachment processes, interfering with their ability to develop healthy
adult relationships. See Holtzworth-Munroe et al., supra note 252, at 12-13.
261. See Holtzworth-Munroe et al., supra note 252, at 7.
262. Although some research has suggested a correlation between minority status
and domestic violence, the difference tends to lie not with race or ethnicity itself,
but with other factors such as income, employment status, and age. For example, in
a nationally representative survey, rates of abuse were approximately 17% for Afri-
can American couples, 17% for Latino couples, and 12% for white couples. See
Holtzworth-Munroe et al., supra note 252, at 8. When controlling for
sociodemographic variables, ethnicity and race were no longer significant. See id.; see
also WILT ET. AL., supra note 43, at 3 (finding that in New York City, female ho-
micide victims were killed disproportionate to race).
263. See Gondolf, supra note 145, at 195.
264. See Gerald T. Hotaling & David B. Sugarman, Prevention of Wife Assault, in
TREATMENT OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 102, at 385, 400; Holtzworth-Munroe et
al., supra note 252, at 8.
265. See FAGAN, supra note 3, at 29.
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report violence to police, police are more likely to arrest people
in poor and middle-class neighborhoods than upper-class ones,
and women without economic resources are more likely to seek
shelter than those with higher incomes. Those with a lower so-
cioeconomic status are likely to be over-represented in batterer
samples.
Second, some have theorized that the relationship between
lower socioeconomic status and domestic violence is due, in part,
to the existence of a "subculture of violence" that condones vio-
lence in general and assaultive behavior towards women in par-
ticular. 6 This explanation emerges from theories linking do-
mestic violence to deep-seated cultural acceptance of violence
more generally. As William Stacey and Anson Shupe conclude:
[We think there is good reason to believe that a cult of vio-
lence is spreading throughout our society and affecting every
sector. By "cult" we do not mean that it is an organized
movement or conspiracy. Rather, it is a cultural pattern, a
trend. The glorification of violence in motion pictures, televi-
sion, and books, and the electronic media's technical sophisti-
cation that shows us violence realistically but makes it excit-
ing, contribute to this cult. But this is not the cause. The cult
is an acceptance of violence, learning to expect it, to tolerate
it, and to commit it, however much one dreads it. This cult is
stimulated by a violent environment that affects each genera-
tion of men and women, making them more yet desensitized
to the problem.6 7
Those in lower socioeconomic groups might be more suscepti-
ble to this "cult of violence" because they have more to gain and
less to lose by engaging in violent behavior; in other words, they
have no stake in conforming to cultural norms that dictate
against violence.26 "Culture of violence" theories remain highly
controversial as they have a tendency to essentialize poor and
266. See Hotaling & Sugarman, supra note 264, at 401.
267. WILLIAM STACEY & ANSON SHUPE, THE FAMILY SECRET: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
IN AMERICA 196 (1983). The authors reached this conclusion from a study of 542
case histories and 2096 telephone interviews. See id. at xvi-xvii.
268. See infra notes 272-77 and accompanying text (describing factors that lower
one's stake in conformity).
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minority communities as inherently violent.26" Such theories
suggest, however, that violence may be a rational response given
certain environmental and social conditions, not pathological or
determined behavior.
Just as likely is that those with fewer resources face more
stressors. "Indeed, it is generally believed-and certainly makes
good clinical sense-that stress in itself does not lead directly to
violence, but rather that various other factors exacerbate or buff-
er the relationship between stress and [domestic] violence."270
Living in a stressful environment may place some men at higher
risk for the use of aggression.2
The link between domestic violence and poverty is controver-
sial. Describing domestic violence as "our" problem and not
"their" problem is powerful political rhetoric. It facilitates legal
reform and avoids stereotyping poor people and people of color
as inherently dangerous.272 Although demographic factors do
not predict violence, this research suggests that poverty breeds
many ills-domestic violence among them.
Intimate relationships tend to be established between people
of the same ethnic and social background.2 74 Ferraro and
Boychuk suggest that the criminal justice system may treat
intimate violence leniently because of racial and social biases
as opposed to any legal support for patriarchy.275 "Otherwise,
violent crime between nonintimates would be treated more
punitively than that between intimates, and it is not."276 We
might best concentrate resources in communities that suffer
269. See Mark L. Rosenberg & James A. Mercy, Assaultive Violence, in VIOLENCE
IN AmERICA: A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH 14, 25-26 (Mark L. Rosenberg & Mary
Ann Fenley eds., 1991).
270. Holtzworth-Munroe et al., supra note 252, at 12.
271. See id. at 8-9, 12.
272. See, e.g., Kimberl4 Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF
PRIVATE VIOLENCE 93, 100-01 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds.,
1994).
273. See Rosenberg & Mercy, supra note 269, at 4041 (arguing that one way to
reduce assaultive behavior is to both decrease the cultural acceptance of violence and
reduce racial discrimination).
274. See Ferraro & Boychuk, supra note 68, at 215.
275. See id. at 222-23.
276. Id. at 223.
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disproportionately from this problem rather than equalize ef-
forts that are likely to result in unequal outcomes. If life
stressors like poverty and racism exacerbate the use of violence
by men, and possibly women as well, then it is politically irre-
sponsible and intellectually dishonest to ignore this potential
connection.277
C. Recommendations for the Future
This section outlines practical steps to improve domestic vio-
lence sentencing practices. Although none of the following rec-
ommendations are radical in concept, they are intended to pro-
vide guidance and spark innovation among those who work in
this field. These recommendations are intended to address both
the general and the specific goals sought to be accomplished by
punishing domestic abuse. The criminal justice system needs to
reduce its emphasis on individual rehabilitation, at least until
we have a better understanding of what kinds of programs work
best with which types of offenders. .These recommendations are
also intended to extract the politics from the practice of punish-
ment. In our search for solutions it is imperative that we not let
277. Many scholars have suggested that the criminalization of domestic violence can
further racism. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 272, at 103 (arguing that for racially
subordinated people, "home is not simply a man's castle in patriarchal terms, but it
is also a safe haven from the indignities of life in a racist society"); Rimonte, supra
note 220, at 1319-20 (arguing that Asian women are often reluctant to call police to
report domestic abuse because involvement with the criminal justice system brings
shame on the family); Richie, supra note 220, at 43 (arguing that it is problematic
for the African-American community, which has experienced widespread injustice
within the criminal justice system, to turn to the same system "as a vehicle for pro-
tection and problem resolution"). But see Randall Kennedy, The State, The Criminal
Law, and Race: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1255-56 (1994) (arguing that
allegations of the criminal justice system being used as a tool of racial oppression
are overblown and counterproductive and that the main problem confronting black
communities is the failure of the state to provide black communities with the equal
protection of the laws). I share some of Kennedy's concerns. In our efforts to be ra-
cially, culturally, and economically sensitive, we should not allow violence to go un-
checked under the rationale that state intervention is always racist, ethnocentric, or
classist. The underenforcement of domestic violence laws in certain communities de-
nies women legitimate state protection that would allow them to be free from vio-
lence. We also must be careful that sensitivity does not lead to underenforcement,
thus solidifying the perception that the criminal justice system marginalizes the con-
cerns of poor and minority women.
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the competition for control blind us to our ultimate goal of re-
ducing violence.
1. Improve Case Screening
Prosecutors and probation departments should screen cases
prior to making decisions about case disposition, distinguishing
between high-risk offenders and others who pose less dan-
ger.278 To date, no validated risk screening or assessment used
in the United States can guide prosecutors, courts, and proba-
tion departments in differentiating among cases." 9 Currently,
both the Vermont Department of Corrections and the Colorado
Office of Probation Services have received grants under the Vio-
lence Against Women Act to undertake such studies.280 This
instrument can give the criminal justice system another tool to
make better, albeit imperfect, sentence recommendations."B
In the meantime, the criminal justice system should screen for
certain factors in case assessments, recognizing that prosecuting
every case or trying treatment first is not the best use of scarce
resources. In particular, cases should be screened not just for
the sufficiency of evidence,282 but also for past incidents of do-
278. See Murray A. Straus, Identifying Offenders in Criminal Justice Research on
Domestic Assault, in DO ARREST AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 3, at
14 (arguing for the need to distinguish between high- and low-risk offenders and de-
scribing the use of the Conflict Tactics Scale in conjunction with a checklist to help
make these risk distinctions).
279. Some jurisdictions employ a lethality assessment, although it has not been
validated empirically. This type of evaluation requires prosecutors to explore with
the victim such things as the defendant's threats of homicide or suicide, use of
weapons, depression, alcohol or drug abuse, and other patterns of behavior indicating
a disregard for social or legal consequences. See Barbara Hart, Assessing Whether
Batterers Will Kill 12-14 (1990) (on file with author). For example, "[a] man who
'idolizes his female partner, or who depends heavily on her to organize and sustain
his life, or who has isolated himself from all other community, may retaliate against
a partner who decides to end the relationship. He rationalizes that her 'betrayal'
justifies his lethal retaliation." Id. at 13.
280. See, e.g., Vermont Dept. of Corrections, Risk Instrument. Validation Study
(requesting proposals for the development of a risk assessment instrument for do-
mestic violence offenders) (on file with author).
281. See O'Leary et al., supra note 90, at 1220-22. The authors have appended the
Modified Conflicts Tactics Scale to their article, and they urge attorneys to use it as
a tool for screening for domestic violence. See id. at 1234.
282. See Hanna, supra note 2, at 1900 (discussing why these cases need to
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mestic violence that may have gone unreported. Past incidents
of violence not directed at family members seem to be a clear
indication that someone is a chronically violent person;'
batterer treatment programs as currently structured are unlike-
ly to do much good in these cases because the motivations for
violent behavior are not likely to be entirely gender-motivated.
Undertaking risk assessments is difficult, particularly for
prosecutors untrained in social service skills. One way to ease
this burden is for prosecutors' offices to hire social workers to
assist in risk assessments and to aid the victim in preparing for
the prosecution and sentencing outcomes. This can include pre-
paring a safety plan for the victim, relocating her, or helping her
find alternative financial resources if she is economically depen-
dent on the defendant. If jurisdictions employ social workers,
then they are likely to find less resentment and frustration
among prosecutors.2 '
Furthermore, the victim's wishes should not dictate a sen-
tence, particularly in serious cases that warrant incarcera-
tion.2" Exploring the victim's concerns about the outcome of
the case is vital, but prosecutors must recommend sentences
that are appropriate to the crime and to the history of the defen-
dant, and judges must order the same. Extreme caution should
be used before allowing a victim to state her sentencing prefer-
ence in front of the abuser. Women may face retaliation for
requesting more severe sanctions.2" In my experience, many
women will ask publicly that the case be dismissed or referred
overcome the presumption of innocence in order to avoid the appearance of motiva-
tion by a feminist or political agenda).
283. Some have suggested that violence against animals is often a precursor to,
and an integral part of, severe domestic violence. See, e.g., A. William Ritter, Jr.,
The Cycle of Violence Often Begins with Violence Toward Animals, THE PROSECUTOR,
JanJFeb. 1996, at 31 (arguing that animal cruelty is often an integral part of do-
mestic violence and recommending that prosecutors take animal cruelty cases more
seriously and track convictions to support research into criminal patterns that in-
clude violence toward animals).
284. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1506-09 (discussing the role shelters and
support services for battered women play in facilitating criminal prosecution).
285. See, e.g., State v. Hobbs, 801 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
that reconciliation with the victim and her professed desire for them to be together
did not create a mitigating factor justifying a downward departure in the sentence).
286. See Hart, supra note 178, at 99-101.
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to treatment and in private beg that everything be done to keep
her partner in jail. Finally, even if the victim believes she would
be better off if the defendant goes to treatment and not jail, such
an outcome undermines the broader social goals of
criminalization. The criminal justice system ought to be sensi-
tive to the victim's needs and wishes, but it cannot, nor should
it, serve the victim's personal preferences at the expense of
broader community safety.
2. Provide for an Array of Treatment Programs
Jurisdictions need to develop a variety of treatment alterna-
tives, including programs that provide medical screening, drug
and alcohol counseling, and individual as well as group therapy.
We also may want to revisit couples therapy for some families.
Until we have a better idea of how to match people with pro-
grams, we ought to remain open to new and possibly "unconven-
tional" modes of treatment, including those that vary in underly-
ing philosophy, length, treatment modality, and curriculum.'
Unfortunately, little research has attempted to match men with
different forms of treatment.' We need to experiment.
Treatment programs should not be dismissed because they fail
to embrace a particular political agenda or theory of violence.
Criteria for court-mandated treatment programs can be too rig-
id, leaving little room for the development of innovative pro-
grams."9 Also, as in Sussex County, New Jersey,"' criminal
287. See Gondolf, supra note 145, at 200.
288. Cf. D.A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Rele-
vant and Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369, 386 (1990)
(calling for a dramatic increase in the number of evaluative studies of correctional
service over the next decade).
289. See id. at 372 (noting that a growing number of scholars and practitioners
agree that the effectiveness of correctional treatment "is dependent upon what is
delivered to whom in particular studies"). For example, Florida requires a 29-week
program with 24 weekly sessions. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.325(3) (West 1997). The
program must include a psychoeducational model that employs a program content
based on tactics of power and control by one person over another. See id. §
741.325(4). California requires men to fulfill a lengthy list of requirements, including
cultural sensitivity training and responsibility assessments. CAL. PENAL CODE §
1203.097(c) (West Supp. 1997).
290. See Hanna, supra note 2, at 1878-79.
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justice personnel should try to uncover whether some first-time
or minor cases might be aggravated by a stressful life event,
such as the loss of a job or the death of a family member. In
these cases, job training or other services might prove more
useful than mandated batterer treatment in improving the life
situation of those involved.
There is not enough evidence to yet suggest whether pretrial
diversion programs should be abandoned. Although pretrial
diversion can undermine accountability,29' in some cases pre-
trial diversion may be appropriate. The issue is not the concept,
but rather who may participate. For example, young men in
their first relationship who "experiment" with violence may
benefit from a pretrial diversion program and avoid the stigma
of a criminal record early in their adult life. In addition, others
have argued that pretrial diversion can be beneficial to women
who get arrested for defending themselves in the midst of a
violent argument.2
Only those people without any criminal record whatsoever
ought to be eligible for such a program. For example, the Con-
necticut program that allows for pretrial diversion if one has
other criminal convictions, though barring those with domestic
violence convictions, is clearly inappropriate.9 ' Not only does
this undermine individual accountability, but it also sends a
dangerous message that these cases are not as serious as other
offenses. Furthermore, the most dangerous offenders are likely
to have criminal records that do not involve family violence
offenses.294 Any criminal conviction ought to make one ineligi-
ble for a pretrial diversion program.
Judges should be creative with sentencing options and not
fear political backlash if they opt for unconventional alterna-
tives. For example, judges could sentence offenders to weekend
incarceration, allowing them to keep their jobs, but impressing
upon them the costs associated with engaging in violent behav-
ior toward their family members. Short-term incarceration, with
291. See Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 51, at 316.
292. See Hooper, supra note 58, at 172-73.
293. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46(b)-38(c) (West 1995 & Supp. 1997).
294. Cf. Gondolf, supra note 145, at 196-97 (describing the sociopathic batterer
typology).
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the threat of longer stays, may be enough incentive to motivate
some abusers to change their behavior. "[T]he more certain pun-
ishment is, the less severe it need be."29'
Another promising alternative is the use of electronic monitor-
ing devices that monitor the movements of offenders, notifying
probation departments if the offender is not within a certain
radius."' This can help ensure that the defendant obey any
stay-away orders forbidding contact with the victim.
3. Incarcerate When Appropriate
Too few, not too many, men are incarcerated for severe and
chronic violence against their intimate partners. Their abuse
is part of an ingrained pattern of extensive violence and antiso-
cial behavior that is unlikely to yield to either anger-manage-
ment or feminist-based models of treatment."7 As Edward
Gondolf suggests:
Many of the batterers are, in other words, "system failures"
in that they have eluded or not been deterred by previous
apprehension or treatment for their antisocial behavior.
Therefore, short-term jailing or mandated treatment for their
battering seems also unlikely to deter them .... The socio-
pathic batterers, in particular, are likely to be incorrigible,
needing continual restraint."'
Borderline and sociopathic abusers can present the greatest
threat to victims during the criminal process because they are
impulsive, unpredictable, and may have problems with drugs or
alcohol as well as violence. 9 It is incumbent upon prosecutors
295. BENTHAM, supra note 165, at 201.
296. For a description of these devices see, Ford et al., supra note 175, at 261.
297. See Gondolf, supra note 145, at 200.
298. Id.
299. See id. at 197. If Dutton and other social scientists are correct, abusers can
become suicidal and even homicidal when their partner leaves because they are ter-
rified of being left alone. See DTYrrON WITH GOLANT, supra note 18, at 103, 111.
This can increase the risk of separation assault and homicide. See Mahoney, supra
note 146, at 65-71 (describing separation assault); see also Margo Wilson & Martin
Daly, Spousal Homicide Risk and Estrangement, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 3, 11 (1993)
(finding that many spouse killings follow marital separation or assault).
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and victim advocates to help keep these offenders' victims safe
during the criminal process."' Furthermore, these offenders
likely will continue to be violent with new partners given the se-
rial nature of their battering. Thus, incarceration can also pro-
tect potential future victims."0 '
Legislators should develop sentencing guidelines that man-
date incarceration when certain factors exist.0 2 Judges should
not have the discretion to allow men who inflict serious injury
on their partners, use a deadly weapon, or continue to stalk or
harass their victims to remain at large. Although debate contin-
ues about the effectiveness and fairness of mandatory sentences,
at the very least legislators should provide some guidance to the
judiciary as to the appropriate sanctions that ought to be im-
posed in serious cases.
Abused women face many hurdles in putting their lives back
together.3 ' Yet, well-intentioned arguments that incarceration
against a woman's wishes "disempowers" her are overstated.3' 4
300. See Hart, supra note 178, at 107-08 (describing victim advocacy approaches
that help keep women safe during the prosecution process).
301. Cf. Ford et al., supra note 175, at 249 (predicting future state legislative re-
sponses to "habitual batterers").
302. Several states provide examples of mandatory sentencing in domestic violence
cases. In Montana, a batterer convicted for assault will be fined not less than $100
and jailed for no less than 24 hours for a first offense. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
5-206(3)(a) (1997). On the second offense, the fine jumps to not less than $300 and
jail time of not less than 72 hours or more than one year. See id. On a subsequent
conviction, the batterer shall be fined not less than $500 and serve not less than 30
days. See id. California requires incarceration for not less than 96 hours upon a sec-
ond domestic violence conviction, and not less than one year in a treatment pro-
gram. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5(f) (West Supp. 1998). Upon a third conviction,
the minimum time for incarceration is 30 days. See id. § 273.5(g). In Hawaii, viola-
tion of a temporary restraining order is a misdemeanor, and upon a first conviction
incarceration is required for 48 hours. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-4(c) (1993). Upon
a second conviction, mandatory incarceration is 30 days. See id.
Some commentators have suggested that lawmakers will include the concept of
"serial batterers" in the definition of habitual battering to account for new victims of
one violent offender. See Ford et al., supra note 175, at 249. If this happens, then it
is likely that legislators will enact statutes similar to sex offender statutes. See su-
pra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., supra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing the economic hard-
ships women face during a partner's incarceration).
304. Cf Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrests of Batterers: A Reply to Its Critics, in Do
ARRESTS AND RERAmNG ORDERS WORK?, supra note 3, at 115, 141-45 (criticizing
arguments that mandatory arrest policies "disempower" battered women).
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These arguments essentialize women as victims, failing to recog-
nize the resilience and strength that many women find after
they are safely away from their abusers. A woman often needs
the peace of mind that the defendant will be in jail so that she
can start her life anew. Incarceration provides both physical and
mental security. Although most offenders will be released after
only a brief stay in prison, even short-term reprieve from an
abuser can provide the victim with some opportunity to make
what changes she needs to make without fear.
Those who see economic loss as equally "victimizing" as physi-
cal abuse trivialize and obscure the actual harm and risk of death
that result when the most dangerous offenders remain at large. A
woman may face short-term financial hardship if her partner goes
to jail, but this is no different than if her partner was incarcerated
for a drug or property offense. Furthermore, incarceration of a
spouse may motivate a woman to be more financially indepen-
dent, reducing the likelihood that she will stay with an abusive
partner for financial reasons. In the long term, hopefully she can
gain more confidence in herself and the system.
Jurisdictions should automatically notify victims whose abus-
ers are in jail of parole hearings, furloughs, transfers to commu-
nity facilities, and discharges from incarceration." 5 Women
should have the right to participate in parole hearings. When
domestic violence victims believe that early parole will jeopar-
dize their safety, prosecutors and advocates can work together to
provide the parole board with information before making an ear-
ly release decision." 6
What to do with the children in these cases presents the most
difficult challenge to prosecutors and judges. A correlation exists
between witnessing violence and becoming a violent adult.01
In the most serious domestic violence cases, there is also a corre-
lation between domestic violence and child abuse; children who
grow up in violent homes can be injured or abused by a violent
305. Many states already have laws that require these procedures, see, e.g., PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-9.3 (West Supp. 1997), but most only cover notice to vic-
tims of felonious assaults. Furthermore, victims are generally only entitled to this
information if they request it from the district attorney. See, e.g., id. § 180-9.7.
306. See Hart, supra note 178, at 104-05.
307. See supra notes 211, 260 and accompanying text.
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parent or step-parent."' 8 Yet, evidence also suggests that chil-
dren whose parents are incarcerated, or absent from the home,
are more likely to be incarcerated themselves.0 9
One innovative way to ease the impact on children whose par-
ents are incarcerated for spousal abuse is to develop programs
like the one developed in the Dade County Domestic Violence
Family Court. The court, in partnership with a facility associat-
ed with the University of Miami School of Medicine, developed a
ten-week, age-specific counseling program for children who have
witnessed domestic violence."' l Parents learn about the effects
of violence on children, and some judges make completion of the
counseling by the defendant's children a condition of proba-
tion.' Although the Dade County Domestic Violence Family
Court only handles misdemeanor cases that are diverted to
treatment instead of jail, similar programs could be developed
for children whose parents are incarcerated as a result of a do-
mestic offense.
4. Establish Specialized Probation Departments
Many police departments and prosecutor's offices have special-
ized domestic violence units. 12 This trend can be expanded to
probation departments. Specialized probation units give higher
priority and follow-up in domestic violence cases that normally
slip through the cracks."3 Probation officers in these units can
continue to work with victims as well as offenders, ensuring that
if the defendant recidivates, consequences will follow. They can
also assist prosecutors in filing violations of probation charges,
thus providing more information through intensified supervision
of offenders. Finally, it takes experience to develop the skills
308. See id.
309. See Hirschi, supra note 212, at 136-37.
310. See FAGAN, supra note 3, at 22.
311. See id.
312. See Cahn, supra note 51, at 171; Hart, supra note 178, at 105-08; see also
supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing specialized prosecution units).
313. See Cahn, supra note 51, at 175-76; see also FAGAN, supra note 3, at 11, 16-
17 (finding that specialized prosecution units created incentives for vigorous prosecu-
tion without competing with other units for scarce resources, allowing prosecutors to
focus on the more personalized nature of domestic violence).
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necessary to monitor these cases; staffing units with dedicated
people facilitates long-term success.
5. Educate Criminal Justice Personnel
Prosecutors, judges, and other court personnel need education
about domestic violence. Some states mandate judicial educa-
tion.314 But the education rarely includes issues such as
batterer typologies, treatment programs, and the different theo-
ries that might be used to better understand this phenomenon.
Court personnel need more complete information to make better
sentencing decisions.
Furthermore, defense counsel should be included in domestic
violence education programs. We often overlook the difficult po-
sition many private and public defenders are placed in when
having to advise clients on guilty pleas and sentence recommen-
dations. Many defense attorneys are concerned with their
clients' long-term well-being as well as their short-term acquit-
tal. Bringing defense counsel into the fold is likely to improve
coordinated community responses to domestic violence." 5
6. Undertake More Collaborative Research Efforts
Bridging the gap between lawmakers, activists, and the social
sciences holds enormous potential for further understanding and
ultimately better policies. Interdisciplinary teams can develop
and evaluate creative programs." Funding for research on in-
tervention programs must be adequate. 7 Studies of treatment
314. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.030(12)(c) (West Supp. 1998) (re-
quiring training for police chiefs on how to deal with domestic violence cases); see
also HART ET AL., supra note 47, at 99 (encouraging judicial education).
315. See Buel, supra note 193 (discussing the involvement of defense counsel in
community coordinating councils).
316. See, e.g., PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 92, at 17-19; Gwinn & O'Dell, supra
note 51, at 304; Hanna, supra note 2, at 1897-98; Salzman, supra note 56, at 338-
53. For example, on March 21, 1997, Vermont Law School sponsored a conference
with the Schweitzer Fellowship Program that brought together various experts in
and around the state of Vermont to discuss the community impact of domestic vio-
lence, including efforts between medical and legal personnel. See Royal Ford, Leaving
the Road Behind: Vt. Woman Quits Trucking to Aid the Fight Against Abuse, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Mar. 16, 1997, at B1, available in 1997 WL 6245785.
317. See FAGAN, supra note 3, at 34-35.
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programs should be longer and broader in scope; random assign-
ments with control and comparison groups are vital to meaning-
ful research in this area.
One reason for the inadequate knowledge base about vio-
lence or its interventions has been the traditionally low
level of fumding for violence research. Reductions in violence,
like progress in the fight of disease and technological ad-
vancement, will begin when there are investments in knowl-
edge development commensurate with the urgency of the
problem.3
18
Although grants under VAWA will certainly aid in this ef-
fort, 19 whether the funding for research and interventions will
be adequate to make a long-term difference remains to be seen.
In particular, a randomized study that assigns abusers to differ-
ent punishments is vital before we continue to put faith in
treatment. We also need better evaluations of treatment pro-
grams, measuring both short- and long-term recidivism rates.
Finally, we should not be afraid to ask what information the
medical community might offer about the relationship between
chemical addiction and other neurological conditions that might
influence violent behavior.
In addition, lawmakers need to pay more attention to good
social science research and become more comfortable sifting
through data before instituting politically promising policies. At
the same time, academics need to write about their findings in
such a way that is accessible to the general public. Much of the
current research is coded in technical language, making it diffi-
cult for lawmakers to put to use. To build the bridge among dis-
318. Id. at 47 (citations omitted).
319. The Violence Against Women Act authorizes grants to fund state domestic vio-
lence coalitions that further the purpose of domestic violence intervention and pre-
vention through activities such as "the adoption of aggressive and vertical prosecu-
tion policies." 42 U.S.C. § 10410(a)(2)(E) (1994). Furthermore, the federal government
makes available "Model State leadership grants" to 10 states that have statewide
policies that "authorize and encourage prosecutors to pursue cases where a criminal
case can be proved, including proceeding without the active involvement of the vic-
tim if necessary; and . . . implement model projects that include either ... a 'no-
drop' prosecution policy; or . . . a vertical prosecution policy." Id. § 10415(b)(3)(A)-(B).
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ciplines we need to listen and speak a more common language.
We are a nation obsessed with violence and deeply troubled by
the breakdown of the American family. We continue to restruc-
ture social institutions to promote opportunities for women. Do-
mestic violence stands in the way of achieving these goals. If we
are committed to social policies that keep us safer, help families
stay together, and provide women with more freedom, then we
have to make some hard choices about how aggressively we
want to fight this problem, and we have to live with the costs as
well as the benefits of those decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article suggests that those responsible for the solutions to
domestic violence have much to learn from each other before
claiming to have found "the answer." As the criminal justice
system's misguided preference for batterer treatment as "punish-
ment" illustrates, until we can distinguish among men, we risk
overpoliticizing domestic violence and foregoing opportunities to
develop a richer understanding of intimate violence. Interdisci-
plinary insights and close attention to both empirical and descrip-
tive data can illuminate our search for punishment alternatives
that serve both social goals and the particulars of each case.
I am not prepared to abandon my optimism that we can make
a difference. The criminalization of domestic violence plays a
crucial, albeit not solitary, role in curbing family violence. Like
any solution to a problem as complex as battering, progress will
have its price. If we institute more comprehensive risk assess-
ments along with more aggressive arrest and prosecution poli-
cies, then we are likely to find that more men are incarcerated
rather than treated. Some jurisdictions may not pursue minor
cases, concentrating resources on the serious ones. Batterer
treatment programs as we now know them may no longer be the
preferred punishment alternative. Women victimized by violence
may find themselves struggling economically and emotionally if
their partners go to jail. Children in these homes face a no-win
situation. All of these strategies will require an investment of
time and resources. And there are no guarantees that in every
case we can ultimately deter violence and keep women safe.
Nevertheless, we must be honest. All men are not alike. Some
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can and want to change their behavior through some form of
treatment. Others cannot or will not change. As we continue to
struggle to do the right thing, we ultimately have to accept the
paradox of hope.
